6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006)
An anonymous tip, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; reasonable suspicion requires predictive information or observation of suspicious conduct.
Summary
Police officers, responding to an anonymous tip about a Black male with a gun, approached the defendant, who matched the description and began walking away. The officers drew their guns and ordered him to stop. The defendant then reached towards his waistband, and a subsequent search revealed a firearm. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the gun should have been suppressed because the initial gunpoint stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion. The anonymous tip, lacking predictive information, and the defendant’s act of walking away did not establish the necessary level of suspicion for a forcible stop under established Fourth Amendment principles.
Facts
On November 12, 1997, police officers received an anonymous radio call regarding a dispute involving a Black male with a gun, described as approximately 18 years old, wearing a gray jacket and red hat.
The officers arrived at the scene within one minute and observed the defendant, who matched the description, but no dispute was in progress.
As the officers approached, the defendant began to walk away.
Without any verbal inquiry, the officers drew their guns and ordered the defendant to stop.
Procedural History
The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to suppress the gun.
Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress.
The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the defendant’s movement toward his waistband justified the frisk.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.
Issue(s)
Whether an anonymous tip, combined with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a forcible stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.
Holding
No, because an anonymous tip lacking predictive information, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; such a stop requires a higher level of suspicion based on predictive information from the tip or independent observation of suspicious conduct by the officers.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court applied the four-level test from People v. De Bour, which distinguishes between permissible police encounters based on the level of suspicion. Here, the gunpoint stop constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion.
An anonymous tip alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion unless it contains predictive information that allows police to test the tip’s reliability, as established in Florida v. J.L. and People v. William II. The Court emphasized, “[R]easonable suspicion ‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’” (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)).
Defendant’s act of walking away from the police, while potentially generating a common-law right of inquiry, did not elevate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop. The Court noted that “[T]he police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question them . . . without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (quoting People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728 (1992)).
Elevating a common-law inquiry to a forcible stop based solely on walking away would eliminate the “right to be let alone.” Additional information or observations of suspicious conduct are necessary to justify a forcible stop.
The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the combination of the anonymous tip and evasion created reasonable suspicion, asserting that a forcible stop requires more than just the possibility of a crime; it requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.