6 N.Y.3d 248 (2006)

A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal, made as part of a plea agreement, encompasses a waiver of the right to invoke the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce the sentence, but the trial court must ensure the defendant understands that the right to appeal is separate from the rights forfeited upon a guilty plea.

Summary

This case consolidates three appeals to determine whether a defendant who has validly waived the right to appeal can still ask the Appellate Division to reduce a sentence in the interest of justice. The Court of Appeals held that a valid appeal waiver does preclude such review, emphasizing the importance of a thorough colloquy to ensure the defendant understands they are giving up a right distinct from those automatically forfeited by pleading guilty. The Court affirmed the waivers in *Lopez* and *Nicholson* but found the waiver in *Billingslea* invalid due to an inadequate explanation on the record.

Facts

* People v. Lopez: Lopez pleaded guilty to a reduced charge in exchange for a 2 1/2 to 5-year sentence and waived his right to appeal, both verbally and in writing.
* People v. Billingslea: Billingslea pleaded guilty to manslaughter for stabbing her best friend and daughter (resulting in the daughter’s death), receiving a 15-year sentence after waiving her right to appeal.
* People v. Nicholson: Nicholson pleaded guilty to attempted murder after a knife fight, receiving an eight-year sentence and waiving his right to appeal.

Procedural History

* Lopez: The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the appeal waiver encompassed the excessive sentence claim and foreclosed interest of justice review.
* Billingslea: The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal.
* Nicholson: The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the valid waiver of the right to appeal encompassed the claim that the agreed-upon sentence was excessive, foreclosing interest of justice review.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal includes a waiver of the right to invoke the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce the sentence.
2. Whether the trial court adequately ensured that each defendant understood they were surrendering the right to appeal when they waived it as part of their plea agreement.

Holding

1. Yes, because by waiving the right to appeal in connection with a negotiated plea and sentence, a defendant agrees to end the proceedings entirely at the time of sentencing and to accept as reasonable the sentence imposed.
2. The waiver was valid in *Lopez* and *Nicholson*, but not in *Billingslea* because the trial court’s explanation was misleading; therefore,
* Affirm the orders in *People v Lopez* and *People v Nicholson*
* Reverse the order in *People v Billingslea* and remit the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the excessive sentencing issue.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that a valid appeal waiver encompasses any issue that does not involve a right of constitutional dimension going to “the very heart of the process” (People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230 [2000]). An appeal waiver facilitates the prompt and effective resolution of criminal litigation. The court emphasized fairness and finality, noting that the parties should be confident that the “ ‘carefully orchestrated bargain’ ” of an agreed-upon sentence will not be disturbed. However, the Court also emphasized the importance of ensuring defendants understand they are relinquishing a known right, distinct from the rights automatically forfeited by pleading guilty (e.g., the right to remain silent, confront accusers, and a jury trial). The record must demonstrate this understanding. In *Billingslea*, the trial court’s statement that “when you plead guilty you waive your right of appeal” was deemed misleading and insufficient to establish a knowing waiver. In *Nicholson*, the fuller colloquy, where the court described the nature of the right being waived without lumping it in with other forfeited trial rights, was sufficient. The court noted, “A better practice might have been to explain to defendant that though he ordinarily retains the right to an appeal even after pleading guilty, in this case he was being offered a particular plea by the prosecution on the condition that he give up that right.”