2 N.Y.3d 737 (2004)

A trial court’s determination regarding a juror’s qualification will be upheld if the juror unequivocally declares impartiality and the court reasonably concludes the juror is not grossly unqualified.

Summary

Defendant was convicted of attempted rape and sodomy. During deliberations, a juror’s fitness was questioned based on a claim she had been raped. After questioning, the juror denied being raped and affirmed her impartiality. The trial court denied a mistrial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied the mistrial motion because the juror unequivocally stated she had never been raped and affirmed her ability to render an impartial verdict. The Court also found that defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to conduct a probing and tactful inquiry was unpreserved. Further, the court properly denied the motion to set aside the verdict because the evidence was not of the type that would entitle the defendant to a new trial.

Facts

Defendant was charged with rape and related crimes. During jury deliberations, the foreperson raised a concern that a juror should be excused because she claimed to have been forcibly raped by her boyfriend or fiancé. The trial court questioned the juror, who denied ever being raped. The juror also affirmed that her previous answer that she had never been the victim of a crime was true. The defense moved for a mistrial which was denied. The jury convicted the defendant of attempted rape and sodomy. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony from a parole officer that would tend to impeach the victim’s testimony.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial and subsequent motion to set aside the verdict, sentencing him as a second felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The case then went to the Court of Appeals after a Judge of that court granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on concerns about a juror’s qualification and impartiality.

2. Whether the defendant’s claim that the court failed to conduct a probing inquiry of the juror was preserved for appellate review.

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence.

Holding

1. No, because the juror unequivocally declared that she had never been raped and stated that she could render an impartial verdict.

2. No, because the defendant failed to object to the scope or intensity of the court’s inquiry at trial.

3. No, because the testimony offered in conjunction with the defendant’s motion was unclear and lacked indicia of certainty, and merely tended to impeach the victim’s trial testimony.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the juror was not grossly unqualified to serve. The court emphasized the juror’s unequivocal denial of ever being raped and her affirmation of impartiality. The Court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s credibility. Regarding the claim that the trial court failed to conduct a probing inquiry, the Court stated that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant did not object to the scope or intensity of the inquiry at trial, nor did he request further questioning. The Court of Appeals also stated that a defendant must inform the court that its questioning was insufficient or objectionable, or suggest additional avenues of inquiry, to preserve the issue for appellate review.

Concerning the motion to set aside the verdict, the Court found that the testimony offered in support of the motion was “unclear, equivocal and lacking in indicia of certainty.” The Court stated that the testimony did not give rise to a “probability” of a verdict more favorable to the defendant, as required by CPL 330.30 (3). Furthermore, the Court noted that the testimony merely tended to impeach the victim’s trial testimony, which is “not the sort of ‘newly discovered evidence’ that would entitle a defendant to a new trial” (People v Jackson, 78 NY2d 638, 645 [1991]).

The Court emphasized the importance of raising objections at trial to preserve issues for appellate review, stating that, “In the absence of a protest to the scope or intensity of the court’s inquiry, no question of law was preserved for our review.” This highlights the practical importance of timely objections in preserving legal arguments for appeal.