People v. McIntosh, 96 N.Y.2d 521 (2001)
A request to search, and any subsequent consent, is invalid unless supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s suppression order, holding that the police lacked a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify their extended questioning of the defendant. The Court reiterated that consent to search is invalid unless the police have a founded suspicion of criminality prior to requesting the search. Because the lower courts found that the defendant only granted permission to search after being questioned in a manner that suggested he was suspected of a crime without any founded suspicion, the evidence obtained from the search was suppressed.
Facts
The police questioned the defendant in circumstances that led him to believe he was suspected of criminal activity. After this questioning, the defendant granted the police permission to search his person and his car. The suppression court found that the police lacked a founded suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the questioning and the request for consent.
Procedural History
The suppression court ruled that the evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed this ruling. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether a consent to search is valid when the request to search is not supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.
Holding
No, because a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Hollman, stating that a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality. The Court emphasized that the lower courts had determined that the defendant only gave permission to search after questioning that reasonably led him to believe he was suspected of criminality, and that this questioning was not based on any founded suspicion. The Court stated, “When, as here, there is support in the record for the lower courts’ undisturbed finding as to the lack of a founded suspicion of criminality, our review is at an end.” The Court effectively deferred to the factual findings of the lower courts regarding the absence of founded suspicion.