5 N.Y.3d 196 (2005)
CPL 160.50(1)(d)(ii) does not authorize a superior court to unseal records and make them available to a prosecutor for the purpose of making sentencing recommendations; the statute’s primary focus is on unsealing records for investigatory purposes.
Summary
This case addresses whether a prosecutor can access sealed criminal records to make sentencing recommendations in a subsequent case. The Court of Appeals held that CPL 160.50(1)(d)(ii) does not allow a superior court to unseal records for this purpose. The Court reasoned that the statute narrowly defines the circumstances under which sealed records can be accessed, primarily focusing on investigatory uses rather than aiding in sentencing. The decision emphasizes the importance of protecting individuals from the adverse consequences of unsuccessful criminal prosecutions by limiting access to sealed records.
Facts
Four petitioners were convicted of obstructing governmental administration and disorderly conduct after participating in a disruptive political demonstration. During sentencing, the prosecutor sought to unseal the petitioners’ prior criminal records to demonstrate a pattern of civil disobedience and argue for a harsher sentence. The prosecutor argued that the details of prior cases were relevant for determining an appropriate sentence.
Procedural History
The People moved ex parte in Supreme Court to unseal records pursuant to CPL 160.50(1)(d)(ii) and 160.55(1)(d)(ii). Supreme Court granted the motions. Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to vacate its unsealing orders, reseal the records, and preclude the People from using the information. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ contention. Petitioners filed a CPLR article 78 petition in the Appellate Division, which the Court dismissed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
- Whether CPL 160.50(1)(d)(ii) authorizes a superior court to make sealed records available to a prosecutor for purposes of making sentencing recommendations.
Holding
- No, because the statute’s primary focus is the unsealing of records for investigatory purposes, and the legislature has narrowly defined the exceptions allowing access to sealed records.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the statute’s legislative history and plain language indicate that access to sealed records is restricted to a few narrow exceptions. The Court emphasized that “[t]he sealing requirement was designed to lessen the adverse consequences of unsuccessful criminal prosecutions by limiting access to official records and papers in criminal proceedings which terminate in favor of the accused.” The Court also noted that within section 160.50 itself, the term “law enforcement agency” always appears in conjunction with the terms “police department” and/or “the division of criminal justice services,” except in subdivision (1) (d) (ii). Further, the Court drew a distinction between CPL 160.50(1)(d)(i), which authorizes disclosure to a “prosecutor” in a “proceeding,” and CPL 160.50(1)(d)(ii), which simply refers to a “law enforcement agency,” indicating that the Legislature intended the latter to focus on investigative functions. The court stated, “The statute’s provisions strongly suggest that its primary focus is the unsealing of records for investigatory purposes.” Because the prosecutor’s request was for sentencing purposes, it fell outside the permissible scope of the statute. The Court concluded that allowing the prosecutor access to sealed records for sentencing would broaden the exception beyond what the legislature intended, undermining the protections afforded by the sealing statute. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the unsealing orders, and ordered the records resealed.