People v. Jeanniton, 3 N.Y.3d 642 (2004)
New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) police officers, as defined under Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20(34)(o), possess the authority to enforce traffic laws within the designated New York City watershed area, extending their powers beyond solely protecting water facilities to include public safety.
Summary
This case addresses whether DEP police officers can issue speeding tickets within the NYC watershed. The Court of Appeals held that they can, reasoning that their authority extends beyond protecting water sources to protecting persons within the watershed. The Court emphasized that CPL 1.20(34)(o) grants DEP police power to protect both the water supply and individuals near water sources. While acknowledging that routine traffic enforcement is not the DEP’s core mission, the Court found that issuing speeding tickets falls within their broad police powers, especially given the potential for accidents to pollute the watershed.
Facts
Two defendants, Mary Jeanniton and Andrew Van Buren, received speeding tickets from DEP police officers within the Town of Hamden, Delaware County, which lies within the NYC watershed. The tickets were returnable in Hamden Town Court. The defendants were not on city-owned property but were within the watershed boundaries.
Procedural History
The Hamden Town Court dismissed the tickets, arguing the DEP police lacked jurisdiction. Delaware County Court affirmed this decision, reasoning the 1906 legislation only authorized DEP police functions during water facility construction, which was not occurring. The County Court also asserted the DEP violated municipal home rule by engaging in law enforcement without the town’s consent. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether DEP police officers are authorized under CPL 1.20(34)(o) to enforce traffic laws, specifically issuing speeding tickets, within the NYC watershed, even when the enforcement is not directly related to protecting water facilities or sources.
2. Whether the exercise of such authority by DEP police violates the municipal home rule provisions of the New York State Constitution.
Holding
1. Yes, because CPL 1.20(34)(o) grants DEP police jurisdiction to protect the sources, works, and transmission of water supplied to NYC and to protect persons on or in the vicinity of such water sources, which can include enforcing traffic laws that protect public safety within the watershed.
2. No, because the protection of the public water supply is a matter of sufficient concern to the State to exclude it from the strictures of the municipal home rule provisions of the State Constitution.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that CPL 140.10 outlines the general authority of police officers to make arrests for petty offenses, including traffic violations, provided the offense occurred within the officer’s geographical area of employment. The Court found the DEP officers were patrolling within their geographical jurisdiction, as the alleged speeding infractions occurred within the designated watershed area. The court rejected the argument that DEP police should be restricted to activities directly protecting water facilities. It noted that watershed lands are themselves “water sources” that DEP police are required to protect. The court reasoned that a speeding motorist could pose a danger to the watershed by causing an accident leading to the discharge of pollutants onto watershed lands. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that CPL 1.20(34)(o) authorizes DEP police “to protect persons” within the watershed, which includes enforcing traffic laws that protect drivers, passengers, and the public. The Court also addressed the municipal home rule argument, stating that the protection of the public water supply is a matter of state concern, therefore exempt from municipal home rule restrictions. The Court cited Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490, 494 (1977), noting that “that a proper concern of the State may also touch upon local concerns does not mean that the State may not freely legislate with respect to such concerns”.