4 N.Y.3d 200 (2005)
r
r
General Municipal Law § 50-i, which sets a time limit for commencing actions against a municipality, constitutes a statute of limitations subject to tolling provisions, rather than a condition precedent to suit that cannot be tolled.
r
r
Summary
r
Plaintiff, injured in a city-owned van, initially filed a federal action that was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He then commenced a state court action against the City, which the City sought to dismiss as time-barred under General Municipal Law § 50-i. The court had to determine whether § 50-i was a statute of limitations, subject to tolling under CPLR 205(a), or a condition precedent. The Court of Appeals held that § 50-i is a statute of limitations and thus subject to tolling, allowing the plaintiff’s suit to proceed.
r
r
Facts
r
On December 17, 1997, Joseph Campbell, a wheelchair-bound passenger in a City of New York van, was injured when his wheelchair wasn’t properly restrained, causing him to fall. He served a notice of claim on the City on March 17, 1998.
r
r
Procedural History
r
Plaintiff first filed a federal action, which was dismissed on April 8, 2002, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He then filed a state court action on July 10, 2002. The City moved to dismiss based on General Municipal Law § 50-i (1)(c). Supreme Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals then reversed the lower courts’ decisions.
r
r
Issue(s)
r
Whether the one-year-and-90-day period in General Municipal Law § 50-i constitutes a statute of limitations, subject to the tolling provision of CPLR 205(a), or a condition precedent to suit.
r
r
Holding
r
Yes, because the year-and-90-day requirement in General Municipal Law § 50-i is a statute of limitations subject to tolling, and not a condition precedent to suit. The Court found no indication the legislature intended the time limitation as an integral part of waiving sovereign immunity.
r
r
Court’s Reasoning
r
The Court relied on prior precedent consistently treating the year-and-90-day provision in § 50-i as a statute of limitations. The court distinguished this case from Yonkers Contr. Co. v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., where the time limitation was deemed a condition precedent because it was an integral part of the legislative enactment waiving sovereign immunity. The Court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 50-i does not use the term