4 N.Y.3d 35 (2004)
An employee cannot recover under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries caused solely by their failure to use adequate safety devices provided by the employer, especially when the employee was instructed to use them, even if the instructions were given weeks prior to the accident.
Summary
Cahill, a construction worker, sued the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority after being injured in a fall. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to Cahill, holding that a jury could find his own conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The court emphasized that even with the strict liability imposed by Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff’s actions can negate liability if adequate safety devices were available, the worker knew of their availability and the requirement to use them, and chose not to use them for no good reason. This case clarifies the application of the “recalcitrant worker” defense and the importance of proximate cause in Labor Law § 240(1) claims.
Facts
Cahill was a construction worker repairing the Triborough Bridge. He used safety lines when available to ascend and descend the forms. Safety harnesses with lanyards were provided. He had received safety training and instructions on using safety lines. Weeks before the accident, Cahill’s supervisor caught him climbing without a safety line and reiterated the need to use them. On the day of the accident, instead of using an available safety line, Cahill used a position hook (not designed for climbing) and fell approximately 10-15 feet, sustaining injuries.
Procedural History
Cahill sued the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of Cahill. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating the “recalcitrant worker” defense did not apply because there wasn’t an immediate instruction to use the harness. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denying Cahill’s motion for summary judgment.
Issue(s)
Whether an employee can recover under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained when they fail to use available and adequate safety devices, despite prior instruction, and whether such failure constitutes the sole proximate cause of their injuries, thus precluding recovery.
Holding
No, because a jury could find that the employee’s own conduct, specifically his failure to use available safety devices after being instructed to do so, was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, thus negating liability under Labor Law § 240(1).
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a strict, non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide adequate safety devices, a plaintiff’s own actions can be the sole proximate cause of the accident, precluding recovery. The court emphasized the importance of proximate cause, stating that “[e]ven when a worker is not ‘recalcitrant’ . . . there can be no liability under section 240 (1) when there is no violation and the worker’s actions (here, his negligence) are the ‘sole proximate cause’ of the accident.” The court found that a jury could determine Cahill had adequate safety devices available, knew he was expected to use them, chose not to, and that this choice was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The court cited Smith v Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., noting an owner is not liable for failing to “insist that a recalcitrant worker use the devices.” The court clarified that the timing of the instruction was not determinative; the key is whether the worker knowingly disregarded instructions and available safety devices, making their actions the sole cause of the accident.