People v. Resek, 3 N.Y.3d 385 (2004)

Evidence of an uncharged crime is inadmissible when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, particularly when a grand jury has dismissed the charge, and admitting such evidence to explain police actions without revealing the dismissal constitutes reversible error.

Summary

Resek was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. At trial, the court allowed police officers to testify that they had monitored Resek’s vehicle based on a report that it was stolen. However, the jury was not informed that the grand jury had refused to indict Resek for possession of a stolen car. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the testimony regarding the stolen car, under the circumstances, deprived Resek of a fair trial because the prejudice outweighed the probative value, especially since the jury was unaware the grand jury had dismissed the stolen car charge.

Facts

Police, while conducting surveillance of a reportedly stolen car, observed Resek entering the vehicle and driving away. They followed him and arrested him at a gas station. During an inventory search of the car, police found nine glassines of heroin in the glove compartment and 14 more on Resek at the station. Resek was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, but the charge of criminal possession of a stolen car was dismissed by the grand jury.

Procedural History

Before jury selection, the prosecution sought permission to allow the arresting officers to testify about why they arrested Resek, arguing that without this evidence, the jury might speculate that the police had no reason to accost him. Resek objected, pointing out that the grand jury had dismissed the stolen car charges, making the introduction of those charges prejudicial. The trial court sided with the prosecution, permitting evidence of the stolen car allegation to explain police actions, even after being informed of the grand jury’s dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed Resek’s conviction. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the defendant’s alleged possession of a stolen car, when the grand jury had dismissed the charge, and the jury was not informed of the dismissal, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

Holding

Yes, because the prejudice to the defendant outweighed the probative value of the evidence, especially given that the jury was not informed that the grand jury had dismissed the stolen car charge. The limiting instruction given by the court did not cure the error and, in fact, exacerbated it.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that, in some circumstances, evidence of uncharged crimes may be admissible to fill in gaps in “interwoven events” and help the jury understand the case in context. However, such evidence is a “delicate business” because there is a risk that it may divert the jury from the case at hand or introduce more prejudice than evidentiary value. The court distinguished this case from People v. Tosca and People v. Till, where evidence of uncharged crimes was admitted. Here, the court emphasized that the prejudice to Resek outweighed the probative value of the evidence. The court noted that the prosecution’s concern that the jury might think the police acted wrongfully could have been addressed by simply instructing the jurors that the arrest was lawful and that they should not speculate about its reasons. The court found that the limiting instruction given by the trial court worsened the situation because, instead of revealing that the grand jury dismissed the charge, the court told the jurors that they should not infer that Resek did or did not steal the car. The court also clarified that the “complete the narrative” justification for admitting uncharged crimes evidence should not be interpreted as automatically allowing the prosecution to introduce such evidence. The court emphasized that under Molineux jurisprudence, uncharged crimes are inadmissible unless they fall within a recognized exception. The court concluded that the error was not harmless and ordered a new trial. Justice Rosenblatt stated, “Rather than simply reveal to the jury that the grand jury dismissed the charge for possession of a stolen car, the court told the jurors that they should not infer that defendant did or did not steal the car.”