3 N.Y.3d 210 (2004)
A defendant cannot compel their attorney to remain silent and inactive during trial while simultaneously refusing to represent themself; doing so constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Summary
Michael Henriquez confessed to fatally shooting his girlfriend. At trial, he instructed his assigned counsel to remain silent and not participate in any aspect of the defense. Henriquez also refused to represent himself. The trial court, after extensive warnings, allowed the trial to proceed with counsel present but inactive. The jury convicted Henriquez. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Henriquez knowingly waived his right to effective assistance of counsel by refusing to allow his attorney to participate while simultaneously rejecting self-representation.
Facts
Michael Henriquez approached a police car and confessed to killing his girlfriend. Police found the victim with multiple gunshot wounds. Henriquez provided detailed confessions. He was charged with murder and related crimes. Prior to trial, he participated in pre-trial hearings with his assigned counsel. Before opening statements, Henriquez instructed his counsel not to cross-examine witnesses, object to questioning, present any defense, or sum up the case.
Procedural History
Henriquez was convicted of intentional murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the trial to proceed after the defendant refused to allow his assigned counsel to participate in his defense, and the defendant declined to represent himself?
Holding
Yes, because Henriquez intentionally failed to avail himself of his constitutional right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations by preventing counsel’s participation while refusing to represent himself.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that a defendant has the right to counsel or self-representation, but not both simultaneously. The trial court was faced with a defendant attempting to manipulate the system. While it’s preferable for a defendant controlling the defense to proceed *pro se* with counsel as a standby advisor, Henriquez resisted *pro se* status. The court found that Henriquez’s actions constituted a voluntary waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court drew support from *People v. Kelly*, stating a defendant “should not be permitted to nullify a trial and require a new trial by the simple expedient of obstructing every effort of the court to assure to the defendant his legal rights and a fair trial. There comes a point where a defendant must bear the consequences of his conduct, in a courtroom as well as out of it.” The court emphasized that Henriquez was repeatedly informed of his right to use counsel’s services but declined. This intentional decision meant he waived his right to a fair opportunity to defend himself. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court should not have followed the defendant’s instructions, and that doing so deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.