People v. Taub, 99 N.Y.2d 53 (2002)
For a county to assert jurisdiction over a crime based on its ‘particular effect,’ the conduct must cause a concrete and identifiable injury to the county’s governmental processes or community welfare, not merely affect a city-wide agency located within the county.
Summary
Sherman Taub and International Mortgage Servicing Company (IMSC) were indicted in New York County for stealing millions through inflated mortgages. Five counts related to allegedly false tax returns filed by the defendants failing to report interest income from these mortgages. The Court of Appeals addressed whether New York County had jurisdiction over the tax-related counts, arguing a “particular effect” due to the processing of New York City taxes within the county. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the location of city agencies and bank accounts within the county was insufficient to establish a particular effect on the county itself, requiring a more direct and identifiable injury.
Facts
Defendants Taub and IMSC were indicted on multiple counts, including offering a false instrument for filing, based on an alleged scheme to steal millions. The specific counts at issue involved filing allegedly false New York State and City tax returns. These returns did not reflect interest income derived from mortgages held by IMSC on Ocean House, a Queens County adult home. The People argued that New York County had jurisdiction because New York City tax revenues are processed within the county.
Procedural History
Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the five tax-related counts for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent prosecution of those counts. The Appellate Division denied the petition, asserting that the false New York City tax returns had a particular effect on New York County. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the location of New York City agencies and bank accounts within New York County, which are involved in processing city income tax revenue, is sufficient to establish a ‘particular effect’ on the county, thus granting it jurisdiction over a prosecution for underreporting income on those tax returns.
Holding
No, because the location of city agencies and bank accounts within the county is, alone, insufficient to establish a particular effect on that county when the prosecution’s core is the deprivation of revenue from New York City. The impact must represent a concrete and identifiable injury to the county’s governmental processes or community welfare.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized that the ‘particular effect’ must be on New York County specifically, requiring a concrete and identifiable injury to its governmental processes or community welfare. This impact must be more than minor or incidental, harming the community as a whole, and demonstrable before a Grand Jury. The Court distinguished the case from situations where the injury to the prosecuting county is more readily identifiable, such as interference with the county’s courts, exposure of many residents to harm, physical intrusion, or theft of county funds. The court reasoned that allowing New York County to assert jurisdiction solely based on the processing of tax revenues would improperly grant the District Attorney city-wide jurisdiction over tax offenses. The Court stated, “Plainly, CPL 20.40 (2) (c) requires a harm to the prosecuting county, not a harm felt by a city-wide governmental agency that happens to have an office in the county.” The Court found that the People failed to show that the harm suffered by the City was peculiar to New York County. It noted that CPL 20.40(2)(c) requires proof the defendant intended or knew their actions would impact New York County, and that this wasn’t established. As such, the court held that New York County could not assert jurisdiction over all crimes affecting New York City merely because city agencies transact business in Manhattan. The court also addressed and rejected the defendant’s claim that the indictment was facially insufficient.