Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Springs Union Free Sch. Dist., 772 N.E.2d 387 (2002)
Under Education Law § 3202 (4)(a), a student’s “residence,” for determining which school district bears educational costs, requires both physical presence and an intent to remain, akin to domicile, not merely temporary presence in a location like a homeless shelter.
Summary
This case addresses which school district is financially responsible for the education of foster children who resided in a homeless shelter with their mother immediately before entering foster care. The New York Court of Appeals held that the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires both physical presence and an intent to remain permanently, similar to the concept of domicile. Since the children’s stay in the homeless shelter was temporary, their last permanent residence (Springs Union Free School District) was responsible for their educational costs, not the district where the shelter was located (Longwood Central School District). The Court emphasized the importance of predictable cost allocation and avoiding penalizing districts that host homeless shelters.
Facts
A family with four children lived in the Springs Union Free School District from December 1991 until their eviction in July 1993. After the eviction, the family moved between temporary housing, including motels and relatives’ homes. For a period, the mother was incarcerated. In August 1993, the family moved into Shelter Plus, a homeless shelter in Lake Grove. The children did not attend school while at the shelter. In September and October 1993, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) placed the children in foster care within the Longwood Central School District. DSS records listed Springs as the “district of origin” for each child.
Procedural History
Longwood filed a claim against Springs for the cost of educating the children. When Springs did not pay, Longwood initiated three lawsuits seeking tuition reimbursement for the 1994-1995, 1995-1996, and 1996-1997 school years. The Supreme Court consolidated the actions and granted summary judgment to Longwood, concluding the mother’s last permanent residence was Springs. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the temporary residence at Shelter Plus obligated the Longwood district to pay. Longwood appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires only physical presence, or does it also require an intent to remain in a place permanently for the purposes of determining which school district bears the cost of instruction for foster children.
Holding
No, because the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires both physical presence and an intent to remain in a place permanently. A temporary stay, such as in a homeless shelter, does not establish residence for the purpose of assigning educational costs under this statute.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that within Education Law § 3202, “residence” is consistently interpreted as akin to domicile, requiring both physical presence and an intent to make a place a fixed and permanent home. An existing domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is acquired. Education Law § 3202 creates a rebuttable presumption that children share the domicile of their parents. The purpose of § 3202 is to allocate educational costs sensibly between school districts and avoid burdening districts with the costs of educating nonresident children. The Court cited Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 250 (1908). and Catlin v Sobol, 77 NY2d 552, 560 (1991). The court also referenced the Department of Education’s interpretation of “resided” in similar contexts, emphasizing the requirement of “physical presence as an inhabitant of the district combined with an intent to remain” (Appeal of Haldane Cent. School Dist., 32 Ed Dept Rep 156, 159 [Decision No. 12,790] [1992]). The Court emphasized that adopting a physical presence-only definition would create instability and unfairly penalize communities with homeless shelters. A short stay in a district before foster care placement should not obligate that district to pay educational costs for months or years thereafter. The Court specifically rejected Springs’ argument that the mother established a domicile at Shelter Plus. To illustrate the rule, the court quoted that “residence is established by one’s physical presence as an inhabitant within the district, combined with an intent to remain” (Appeal of Stokes, 32 Ed Dept Rep 93, 95 [Decision No. 12,769] [1992]).