1 N.Y.3d 280 (2003)
A defendant is not liable under Labor Law § 240(1) when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, even if the statute imposes strict liability.
Summary
Plaintiff, a contractor, sued after injuring himself while using his own ladder. The jury found the ladder provided proper protection, and the accident was solely due to plaintiff’s negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion to vacate the verdict, holding that Labor Law § 240(1) does not impose liability when a worker’s actions are the sole proximate cause of their injuries, even under a strict liability standard, and that a statutory violation must contribute to the injury.
Facts
Plaintiff, a self-employed contractor, was renovating a two-family house. Defendant Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) provided financing to the homeowner and referred the plaintiff as a potential contractor. Plaintiff used his own extension ladder, which he acknowledged was in good condition. While scraping rust from a window, the ladder retracted, causing plaintiff to fall and injure himself. He conceded the ladder was stable and not defective, and there was no need for someone to steady it.
Procedural History
Plaintiff sued the homeowner and NHS, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the homeowner but denied it to NHS and the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. At trial, the jury found that NHS had the authority to direct the work, but the ladder provided proper protection. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the jury verdict, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a plaintiff can recover under Labor Law § 240(1) when the jury finds that the ladder provided proper protection, and the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole cause of the injury.
2. Whether NHS can be held liable as an agent under Labor Law § 240(1).
Holding
1. No, because Labor Law § 240(1) does not impose liability when the plaintiff’s own negligence is the sole proximate cause of the accident; a statutory violation must contribute to the injury.
2. No, because NHS did not have the requisite supervision and control over the work to be considered an agent under the statute.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reviewed the history and purpose of Labor Law § 240(1), noting its intent to protect workers from unsafe conditions at heights. The Court clarified that strict liability under § 240(1) requires a statutory violation and proximate cause. “Violation of the statute alone is not enough; plaintiff [is] obligated to show that the violation was a contributing cause of his fall.” The Court distinguished the case from situations involving comparative fault, where a culpable defendant can reduce its responsibility. Here, the jury implicitly found the fault was entirely the plaintiff’s. The Court emphasized that “even when a worker is not ‘recalcitrant,’ we have held that there can be no liability under section 240 (1) when there is no violation and the worker’s actions (here, his negligence) are the ‘sole proximate cause’ of the accident.”
The Court distinguished Bland v. Manocherian, where there were findings that the defendants failed to provide proper protection. Here, the ladder was in proper working order, and no further devices were necessary. “To impose liability for a ladder injury even though all the proper safety precautions were met would not further the Legislature’s purpose.” The Court also found NHS lacked the requisite indicia of agency as it did not supervise the contractor. “An agency relationship for purposes of section 240 (1) arises only when work is delegated to a third party who obtains the authority to supervise and control the job.” NHS acted as a lender, and the homeowner retained primary control over the renovation project.