1 N.Y.3d 849 (2004)
A trial court lacks the inherent power to modify a lawful sentence of imprisonment after it has commenced, unless the record clearly indicates a judicial oversight, an accidental mistake of fact, or an inadvertent misstatement that creates ambiguity in the record.
Summary
Vasquez was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years to life. The sentencing court did not specify whether this sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with a prior undischarged sentence. The Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) thus credited Vasquez’s prior time served against the new sentence. The People moved to reopen the sentencing, arguing the court intended the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court agreed and modified the sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the original sentencing record lacked any indication the court intended a consecutive sentence, modification was barred by CPL 430.10.
Facts
In 1979, Vasquez was convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years to life. After being paroled, he committed two more murders in 1995. He was arrested in 1999 for a parole violation and subsequently indicted for the 1995 murders. After a mistrial, he was convicted of four counts of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life on each count, with intentional murder sentences running consecutively, resulting in 50 years to life.
Procedural History
The trial court initially sentenced Vasquez without specifying whether the new sentence was consecutive to the prior undischarged term. After DOCS credited the prior time served, the People moved to reopen sentencing. The trial court granted the motion and modified the sentence to run consecutively. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
- Whether a trial court has the inherent power to modify its lawful sentence of imprisonment where the court did not specify whether the sentence was to run consecutively or concurrently to an undischarged term of imprisonment on an unrelated conviction.
Holding
- No, because the record of the original sentencing proceeding does not indicate that the judge intended to impose consecutive sentences, CPL 430.10 precluded the alteration of the defendant’s sentence.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that CPL 430.10 generally prohibits changing a sentence of imprisonment once it has commenced, except as specifically authorized by law. While courts retain the inherent power to correct clerical errors or conform the record to the truth, this power must be exercised cautiously and only when a mistake clearly appears. The Court distinguished this case from prior cases involving negotiated plea agreements where a sentencing error contradicted the agreement.
The Court relied on People v. Adkinson, where it held that a court could not later amend a sentence to specify consecutive terms when the original sentence was silent on the issue. Penal Law § 70.25(1)(a) dictates that silence regarding whether a sentence runs consecutively or concurrently results in a concurrent sentence by operation of law. The Court emphasized that “[t]he authority to modify a lawful sentence that has commenced is limited to situations where the record in the case clearly indicates the presence of judicial oversight based upon an accidental mistake of fact or an inadvertent misstatement that creates ambiguity in the record.” Because the original record did not indicate an intent for a consecutive sentence, the modification was improper. The Court noted, “[i]n no instance have we recognized a court’s inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over defendant’s objection where the error goes beyond mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record and where the proceeding has terminated by the entry of judgment”.