100 N.Y.2d 318 (2003)
An attorney’s entry into a criminal case, triggering the suspect’s indelible right to counsel, requires direct communication from the attorney or their professional associate to the police; notification by a third party, such as a family member, is insufficient.
Summary
Grice was arrested for a shooting and, after waiving his Miranda rights, gave two incriminating statements. Before the second statement, Grice’s father told police an attorney was coming. Later, an attorney contacted the police, who then ceased questioning. Grice moved to suppress his statements, arguing his right to counsel was violated when police continued questioning after his father’s notification. The court denied the motion, and Grice was convicted on several charges. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the indelible right to counsel requires direct communication by the attorney, not merely notification by a third party.
Facts
Grice was arrested in connection with a shooting.
He was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them at 11:20 a.m.
Grice provided two written statements admitting his involvement as a lookout, signed at 1:45 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.
At approximately 12:30 p.m., Grice’s father told a detective at the police station that an attorney was coming to represent his son, but was told he could not speak to his son.
At 2:10 p.m., Grice’s attorney contacted the lead detective and informed him that he represented Grice. The interrogation then stopped.
Procedural History
Grice moved to suppress his statements, alleging a violation of his state constitutional right to counsel. The hearing court denied the motion.
Following a jury trial, Grice was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of burglary and criminal possession of a weapon.
The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the state constitutional right to counsel is violated when police continue to question a suspect after the suspect’s father informs a detective that an attorney is en route to the police station.
Holding
No, because the indelible right to counsel is triggered by direct communication from the attorney (or their associate) to the police, not by notification from a third party.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the indelible right to counsel, stemming from the State Constitution’s guarantees of due process and the right against self-incrimination, attaches when a criminal action commences, when a suspect requests counsel, or when an attorney enters the matter. The court distinguished the facts from previous cases such as People v. Arthur, emphasizing that “entry” requires an actual appearance or communication by the attorney.
The Court emphasized the need for a “pragmatic and simple test” based on “common sense and fairness” to guide law enforcement and the courts. Requiring direct communication provides an objective measure and confirms the attorney’s actual retention.
The Court rejected the argument that any notification, regardless of the source, should trigger the right to counsel, stating that it would be unreasonable to require the police to cease questioning and begin a separate inquiry to verify whether the defendant is actually represented by counsel.
The court noted that a defendant’s statement of having retained counsel is an invocation of the right, while a third party cannot invoke the right on behalf of an adult defendant because “the right to counsel is personal” to the accused.
The Court explicitly reaffirmed a bright-line rule: “an attorney ‘enters’ a criminal matter and triggers the indelible right to counsel when the attorney or a professional associate of the attorney notifies the police that the suspect is represented by counsel.”
Because only Grice’s father notified the police, and not the attorney, Grice’s right to counsel had not yet attached when he made his statements.