People v. Rodriguez, 100 N.Y.2d 30 (2003)

A defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct unless the misconduct prejudiced a substantial right of the defendant.

Summary

Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover officer. After the verdict, a juror contacted an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) and revealed that he intentionally concealed their friendship during voir dire. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the concealment deprived him of a fair jury selection. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, finding no prejudice to the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, juror misconduct does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. The Court also addressed a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation, finding any error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

Facts

An undercover officer asked the defendant for cocaine. The defendant sold the officer cocaine for $20 of prerecorded money. Another undercover officer followed them, transmitting their location to a field team. The field team arrested the defendant and found the prerecorded money in his pocket. After the verdict, a juror, Steven Cohen, contacted Andrew Carey, an ADA, and admitted that he intentionally concealed their friendship during voir dire.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a juror’s concealment of information during voir dire automatically warrants a new trial.
2. Whether the prosecutor’s comments during summation regarding the defense witnesses’ lack of outrage constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

Holding

1. No, because absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant, proof of juror misconduct does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial.
2. No, because although the prosecutor’s comment was uncalled for, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that CPL 330.30(2) authorizes a court to set aside a verdict if “improper conduct by a juror…may have affected a substantial right of the defendant.” The Court cited People v. Irizarry, 83 N.Y.2d 557, 561 (1994), stating that “absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, proof of juror misconduct does not entitle a defendant to a new trial.” The court emphasized that each case must be examined on its unique facts to determine the nature of the misconduct and the likelihood that prejudice was engendered. The Court found that the trial court’s findings, made after a hearing, were supported by the record. The Court stated, “not every misstep by a juror rises to the inherently prejudicial level at which reversal is required automatically” People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394 (1979). The Court further stated “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).

Regarding the prosecutor’s comment, the Court acknowledged it was uncalled for because it made an oblique reference to the defendant’s character, which was not in evidence. However, the Court deemed the error harmless, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242 (1975), due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The Court emphasized that this was “part and parcel of his argument that nothing in the testimony of the defense witnesses showed that defendant ‘couldn’t’ have committed the crime.”