99 N.Y.2d 307 (2002)
A juvenile’s statutory right to a speedy trial in delinquency proceedings is violated when a suppression hearing is unjustifiably protracted, especially for detained juveniles, and the court improperly insists on calling additional witnesses, delaying the fact-finding hearing.
Summary
George T., a juvenile, was charged with criminal possession of marijuana and detained. The Family Court adjourned his suppression hearing multiple times, including a significant delay caused by the court’s insistence on calling an additional witness after the presentment agency rested. This extended the hearing by 47 days. The New York Court of Appeals held that these delays violated George T.’s statutory right to a speedy trial, particularly because he was detained. The Court emphasized the legislative intent for swift dispositions in juvenile cases, reversing the Appellate Division and ordering the petition’s dismissal.
Facts
George T. was arrested and charged with an act that would constitute criminal possession of marijuana. He was detained due to being absent without leave from a prior PINS placement. A suppression hearing was scheduled and repeatedly adjourned, often due to scheduling conflicts. Critically, the Family Court directed the presentment agency to call an additional witness (Detective Alvarez) after the agency had rested its case, further delaying the proceedings when Alvarez was unavailable. George T.’s law guardian objected to these delays and requested his release.
Procedural History
The Family Court denied George T.’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial violations and adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent. The Supreme Court initially granted a writ of habeas corpus, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order of disposition. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the extensive delays in the suppression hearing, particularly those caused by the Family Court’s insistence on calling an additional witness, violated George T.’s statutory right to a speedy trial under Family Court Act § 340.1.
Holding
Yes, because the unjustifiably protracted suppression hearing, including the delay caused by the court’s improper insistence on calling an additional witness, had the effect of eliminating the good cause that had existed and delaying the commencement of the fact-finding hearing for an additional 47 days, thus violating respondent’s speedy trial rights.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized the legislative intent behind Family Court Act § 340.1 to provide speedy trials for juveniles, especially those in detention. The Court cited Matter of Frank C., stating that § 340.1 is a “true `speedy trial’ provision” meant to address all sources of delay. While a suppression hearing can be good cause for adjourning a fact-finding hearing, George T. specifically objected to the continuation of the hearing for the additional witness. The court reasoned that Family Court, by directing the presentment agency to call Detective Alvarez and allowing his testimony to be taken piecemeal, caused considerable further delay and violated Family Court Act § 332.2(4), which requires an expedited hearing for detained respondents. The appropriate remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the petition, as established in Matter of Frank C., and thus, the motion to dismiss should have been granted.