People v. Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d 35 (2002)
A delay in arraignment, even if for the purpose of further police questioning, does not automatically trigger the State constitutional right to counsel; instead, it is a factor to be considered in assessing the voluntariness of a confession.
Summary
The defendant confessed to murder after being arrested and interrogated, but argued that the police deliberately delayed his arraignment to obtain the confession, violating his state constitutional right to counsel. The New York Court of Appeals held that a delay in arraignment, even if intentional, does not automatically trigger the right to counsel. The Court reasoned that the right to counsel attaches at formal proceedings or when a defendant requests counsel, neither of which occurred here. The delay is relevant only to the voluntariness of the confession, an argument the defendant did not raise. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s claim was an unpreserved statutory violation of CPL 140.20, not a constitutional violation.
Facts
Jennifer Yee was found murdered. Detectives learned that Yee was romantically involved with Ramos (the defendant). Ramos was interviewed and made inconsistent statements. He was asked to go to the precinct for further questioning and agreed. At the precinct, Ramos was given food and water. He was read his Miranda rights and waived them. After further questioning, Ramos admitted to being at Yee’s house but denied responsibility. Ramos’s girlfriend told police that Ramos had told her he “messed up” and Yee was “gone.” Police observed what appeared to be blood on Ramos’s shoes and placed him under arrest. The next day, Ramos was re-Mirandized and waived his rights again, giving a full written confession. There was approximately a 15-hour delay between the arrest and arraignment.
Procedural History
Ramos was indicted for second-degree murder and related crimes. He moved to suppress his confession, alleging police coercion, but did not argue a right to counsel violation or that the delay in arraignment led to his confession. The Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Ramos confessed voluntarily after a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. A jury convicted Ramos. On appeal, Ramos argued that the delay in arraignment violated his state constitutional right to counsel. The Appellate Division held that the right to counsel claim could be raised even though unpreserved, but declined to reach the merits due to an insufficient record and affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a deliberate delay in arraignment for the purpose of obtaining a confession triggers the State constitutional right to counsel, allowing the issue to be raised for the first time on appeal despite a lack of preservation?
Holding
No, because a delay in arraignment for the purpose of further police questioning does not establish a deprivation of the State constitutional right to counsel; the claim must be advanced under CPL 140.20(1) and is unpreserved if not raised at trial.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that the State constitutional right to counsel attaches when formal judicial proceedings begin or when a defendant retains or requests an attorney. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the right to counsel automatically attaches. The Court emphasized that Ramos waived his right to counsel twice and did not argue otherwise. Citing People v. Wilson, the Court stated that being physically in police custody awaiting arraignment does not automatically trigger the right to counsel. The Court clarified that a delay in arraignment bears on the voluntariness of a confession, not on the right to counsel. The Court noted that Ramos did not argue that his confession was involuntary or that his waiver of counsel was ineffective. The Court explained that the prompt-arraignment statute, CPL 140.20, is designed to protect against unlawful confinement and ensure that accused persons are advised of their rights, not to ensure the right to counsel. The Court feared that allowing unpreserved claims of delayed arraignment to be raised as constitutional right-to-counsel violations would prejudice the People by preventing them from presenting other reasons for the delay. The Court also found that the record did not reveal any constitutional right-to-counsel violation. “The right to a prompt arraignment is grounded neither in this Court’s constitutional right-to-counsel jurisprudence nor (in the case of the federal rule) in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.”