98 N.Y.2d 336 (2002)
When the prosecutor’s office is unaware of pending charges due to standard procedure and compliance with statutory notification requirements, the period before arraignment may be excluded from speedy trial calculations as an “exceptional circumstance” under CPL 30.30(4)(g).
Summary
Joseph Smietana was convicted of harassment. He appealed, arguing a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the time between the filing of the accusatory instrument and the arraignment was excludable from the speedy trial calculation as an “exceptional circumstance.” The court reasoned that because the District Attorney’s office was unaware of the charges until the arraignment date due to standard procedure, they could not be expected to prepare for trial before that date. This unawareness, in the court’s view, constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the delay.
Facts
A police officer filed an information against Smietana on June 5, 1998, charging him with criminal contempt and harassment based on allegations by his estranged wife. A summons was issued, and Smietana was arraigned on July 14, 1998. The District Attorney’s office was first notified of the charges on the arraignment date. Prior to this, the police, the court, and the District Attorney’s office followed standard procedure, but the District Attorney’s office remained unaware of the pending charges until the arraignment.
Procedural History
The Buffalo City Court initially dismissed the criminal contempt charge and retroactively applied a 30-day speedy trial period for the remaining harassment charge. Smietana moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which the City Court denied. He was convicted of harassment. The County Court, Appellate Term, affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the period between the filing of the accusatory instrument and the arraignment should be charged to the People for speedy trial purposes, even though the District Attorney’s office was unaware of the pending charges during that time.
Holding
No, because the District Attorney’s lack of knowledge of the pending charges before the arraignment constituted an “exceptional circumstance” under CPL 30.30(4)(g), justifying the exclusion of that time period from the speedy trial calculation.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that CPL 30.30 requires the People to diligently pursue prosecution but does not create a trap requiring dismissal when the People are genuinely unable to prepare for trial because they are unaware of the charges. The court emphasized that the police and the court followed proper procedures, and the District Attorney’s office only became aware of the charges at arraignment as per standard practice. The court noted that CPL 110.20 places the duty of notification on the police, who complied by notifying the prosecutor on the arraignment date. The court distinguished this situation from cases where the People delay due to factors within their control. The court stated, “It is axiomatic that the People cannot prepare for the trial of a case they do not know exists.”
The dissent argued that the delay was due to the District Attorney’s policy of remaining unaware of accusatory instruments until arraignment, and that this should not constitute an “exceptional circumstance.” The dissent emphasized that the statutory speedy trial period begins when the accusatory instrument is filed. Chief Judge Kaye, dissenting, stated, “In a situation such as this, where, as a result of their own inaction, the People had less time to prosecute than they thought, they should not benefit from an exceptional circumstance.”