Summerville v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 427 (2000)
A governmental entity is entitled to a new automatic stay each time it files a notice of appeal or moves for leave to appeal, even if a prior automatic stay has lapsed due to failure to comply with CPLR 5519(e).
Summary
In a personal injury action against the City of New York, the Court of Appeals addressed whether a governmental entity obtains a new automatic stay under CPLR 5519(a) when it appeals or seeks leave to appeal an adverse order, even if its original stay lapsed under CPLR 5519(e). The Court held that the City did obtain a new automatic stay when it moved for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, despite failing to preserve its initial stay. The Court reversed the lower court’s order accelerating payments on the judgment, finding that the City’s payments were not untimely due to the successive automatic stays.
Facts
Plaintiff sued the City for personal injuries. A jury awarded damages, which the trial court reduced. A structured judgment was entered in May 1997. The City appealed, triggering an automatic stay under CPLR 5519(a)(1). The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the damages for pain and suffering and ordering a new trial on those damages unless Plaintiff stipulated to a reduced award. Plaintiff stipulated, and an amended judgment was entered on July 6, 1999, requiring the City to make a lump sum payment and purchase an annuity contract. Plaintiff requested satisfaction of the judgment. On August 5, 1999, the City moved for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Procedural History
Plaintiff moved for accelerated payment of the judgment under CPLR 5044. The Appellate Division denied the City’s motion for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for accelerated payment, reasoning that the City’s initial automatic stay had lapsed, and the City had delayed payments. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a governmental entity obtains a new automatic stay under CPLR 5519(a) when it appeals or moves for leave to appeal from an adverse order, even if it failed to continue its original automatic stay under CPLR 5519(e).
Holding
Yes, because CPLR 5519(a)(1) applies to all appeals and motions for leave to appeal, and CPLR 5519(e) only addresses the continuation of an original stay, not the possibility of obtaining a new one.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that CPLR 5519(a)(1) grants an automatic stay to governmental entities pending an appeal or motion for leave to appeal, without limiting its applicability to initial appeals. The Court stated that “CPLR 5519 (a) (1) does not limit availability of a governmental appellant’s automatic stay to appeals to the Appellate Division, but by its terms applies to all appeals and motions for leave to appeal, including those to this Court.” CPLR 5519(e) provides for the continuation of an original stay, but does not preclude a governmental entity from obtaining a new stay if the original one lapses. The Court stated, “subdivision (e) merely provides for the ‘[c]ontinuation of [an original] stay,’ allowing an appellant to retain a stay arising from a first stage appeal without interruption by appealing or seeking leave to appeal to a higher appellate court within the five-day time frame specified therein.” This interpretation aligns with the policy of stabilizing the effect of adverse determinations on governmental entities and preventing disbursement of public funds pending appeal. Even if the City’s first stay lapsed, it obtained a new one when it moved for leave to appeal. Because of the automatic stays, the City’s payments were not untimely under CPLR 5044. The Court emphasized that, “Motion for a stay denied as unnecessary on the ground that the municipal respondents’ motion for leave to appeal in this court provides an automatic stay’ under CPLR 5519 (a) (1).” The Court found no violation of the statutory obligation to provide an annuity contract because there was never a period of time in which a stay had lapsed for as much as 30 days. The determination of whether a payment is made in a timely fashion depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Here, in view of the relatively short periods of time in which the City’s obligation to make the initial lump sum payment was not stayed, the City’s failure to make a lump sum payment of the magnitude involved here cannot be held to be untimely as a matter of law.