People v. Miller, 91 N.Y.2d 372 (1998)
A defendant who pleads guilty to a crime waives their Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution, and may be cross-examined on those admissions in a subsequent trial, even if sentencing on the prior plea is pending, absent a credible claim that the plea is subject to vacatur.
Summary
Miller was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, the court ruled that if Miller testified, the prosecution could cross-examine him regarding a prior robbery to which he had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced. The cross-examination was limited to the facts Miller admitted during his guilty plea allocution. Miller appealed, arguing that because sentencing was pending on the prior robbery, cross-examination violated his right against self-incrimination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Miller waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the admitted facts when he pleaded guilty, and had not demonstrated a risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.
Facts
Miller robbed three children at a McDonald’s restaurant on August 11, 1996. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery on November 20, 1996, admitting under oath to taking $70 from a child. Before sentencing, Miller was arrested for another robbery. At the trial for the second robbery, the People sought to cross-examine Miller about the McDonald’s robbery, for which he was still awaiting sentencing. The trial court permitted the cross-examination, limited to Miller’s admissions during his guilty plea allocution for the McDonald’s robbery. Miller did not testify and was convicted.
Procedural History
After being convicted of robbery, Miller appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Miller leave to appeal to that court.
Issue(s)
Whether a trial court errs in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine a defendant about a prior crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty, but for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced, when the cross-examination is limited to the defendant’s admissions during the guilty plea allocution?
Holding
No, because the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the facts admitted during the plea allocution and did not demonstrate a credible risk of incriminating himself beyond those admitted facts.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289 (1987), where the Court held that a defendant who testifies does not waive their self-incrimination rights with respect to “pending” unrelated criminal charges. Here, Miller had already pleaded guilty to the prior crime, waiving his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the facts he admitted during the plea allocution. The Court emphasized that Miller never suggested that his guilty plea was vulnerable or that there was any ground upon which it could be vacated. The Court also distinguished Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s guilty plea did not waive her right to remain silent during sentencing proceedings where further testimony was expected. In this case, there was no basis for Miller to fear or expect a sentencing hearing at which proof would be taken or that he would be called upon to incriminate himself beyond what he admitted at the plea allocution. The Court stated, “By meticulously limiting the inquiry as it did, the trial court foreclosed any incriminating inquiry as to the McDonald’s crime, save what defendant himself said when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment rights during the plea colloquy.” The court concluded that Miller’s arguments regarding self-incrimination were theoretical and unavailing because the trial court only allowed questioning related to what Miller already admitted to under oath. The Court noted that it was not deciding whether People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168 (1961), which barred the use of withdrawn guilty pleas, should be extended to admissions made in another trial.