96 N.Y.2d 172 (2001)
The emergency doctrine does not apply when the allegedly emergent situation, such as icy road conditions, was foreseeable given the weather conditions and defendant’s awareness of them.
Summary
In this motor vehicle accident case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. Defendant Sanzone’s car slid on ice and collided with plaintiff’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that it was reversible error to give the emergency instruction because the icy conditions were not sudden or unexpected, given the known weather conditions (freezing rain, hail) in the hours leading up to the accident. The defendant was aware of the inclement weather. The Court emphasized that the emergency doctrine applies only when a party faces a sudden and unexpected circumstance not of their own making.
Facts
Defendant Sanzone was driving a vehicle owned by his wife, defendant Cinquemani. The weather that morning consisted of snow, rain, and freezing rain and the temperature was 22 degrees Fahrenheit. As Sanzone drove downhill toward an intersection, his vehicle began to slide on a sheet of ice. Despite pumping the brakes, the car slid through a stop sign and collided with plaintiff Caristo’s vehicle. The Plaintiff and other witnesses confirmed icy conditions. Sanzone was aware of worsening weather conditions for several hours before the accident. Neither driver had trouble controlling their vehicles before this incident.
Procedural History
Plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence. The trial court, over plaintiff’s objection, instructed the jury on the emergency doctrine. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the complaint was dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed. Plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury on the emergency doctrine when the defendant’s vehicle slid on ice, given that the defendant was aware of the inclement weather conditions prior to the accident.
Holding
No, because the icy conditions were not a sudden and unexpected emergency, given the defendant’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the emergency doctrine applies only when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance that leaves little or no time for thought or deliberation. The actor must also not have created the emergency. The Court emphasized that a trial judge must make a threshold determination that there is some reasonable view of the evidence supporting the occurrence of a qualifying emergency. Here, the Court held that even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was no qualifying emergency because, considering Sanzone’s knowledge of the inclement weather, the presence of ice could not be deemed sudden and unexpected. "[T]here was no reasonable view of the evidence that would lead to the conclusion that the ice and slippery road conditions on the Foster Road slope were sudden and unforeseen." The court distinguished this case from Ferrer v. Harris, 55 N.Y.2d 285 (1982), where the emergency doctrine was applicable because a child darted into traffic, an unanticipated event. The dissent argued that it was a question of fact for the jury whether the sheet of ice was unforeseen, given that the roads were otherwise ice-free. The dissent also cited other jurisdictions that had held that the emergency charge should be given in factually similar circumstances. However, the majority stated, "[G]iven Sanzone’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions, the presence of ice on the hill cannot be deemed a sudden and unexpected emergency."