Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 96 N.Y.2d 42 (2001)
CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision that preserves principles of vicarious liability and does not create an exception to the apportionment of liability under CPLR Article 16 for breaches of non-delegable duties.
Summary
This case addresses whether a defendant, whose liability arises from breaching a non-delegable duty, can seek to apportion liability with another tortfeasor under CPLR 1601, or whether CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precludes such apportionment. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) is a savings provision that preserves vicarious liability principles, not an exception to apportionment. Thus, a defendant can seek apportionment even if their liability stems from a non-delegable duty. This clarifies that Article 16 aims to protect low-fault, “deep pocket” defendants, and reading 1602(2)(iv) as an exception would undermine that goal.
Facts
Neville Rangolan, an inmate at Nassau County Correctional Center, was assaulted by fellow inmate Steven King. Rangolan had previously acted as a confidential informant against King, and his file contained a warning not to house them together. A corrections officer negligently placed Rangolan and King in the same dormitory. Rangolan and his wife sued Nassau County, alleging negligence and violation of Rangolan’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Procedural History
The U.S. District Court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim but granted Rangolan judgment as a matter of law on the negligence claim, ordering a trial on damages. The District Court denied the County’s request to instruct the jury on apportionment of damages between the County and King, concluding that CPLR 1602(2)(iv) barred apportionment due to the County’s non-delegable duty. The jury awarded damages to Rangolan and his wife, which were later reduced. Both parties appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim but certified the question of CPLR 1602(2)(iv)’s interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a tortfeasor, like the County, can seek to apportion its liability with another tortfeasor, like King, pursuant to CPLR 1601, or whether CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precludes such a defendant from seeking apportionment when the liability arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty.
Holding
No, CPLR 1602(2)(iv) does not preclude a tortfeasor like the County from seeking apportionment because it is a savings provision designed to preserve vicarious liability, not a blanket exception to the apportionment rule of Article 16.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPLR Article 16 modifies the common-law rule of joint and several liability to protect low-fault defendants. CPLR 1602(2)(iv) states that Article 16 should “not be construed to impair, alter, limit, modify, enlarge, abrogate or restrict…any liability arising by reason of a non-delegable duty or by reason of the doctrine of respondeat superior.” The court held this is a savings provision designed to preserve vicarious liability. The court emphasized that other exceptions within CPLR 1602 explicitly state that Article 16 “shall not apply,” while 1602(2)(iv) uses the language “shall not be construed,” indicating a different legislative intent. The court further reasoned that construing CPLR 1602(2)(iv) as a blanket non-delegable duty exception would render CPLR 1602(8), which specifically addresses non-delegable duties under Labor Law Article 10, redundant. The court stated, “The crafting of these exceptions and savings provisions reflects careful deliberations over the appropriate situations for a modified joint and several liability rule” (Governor’s Approval Mem). Therefore, the County is entitled to a jury charge on apportionment between itself and King. The court explicitly rejected interpretations in cases like Nwaru v Leeds Mgt. Co., 236 AD2d 252, and Cortes v Riverbridge Realty Co., 227 AD2d 430, which incorrectly assumed CPLR 1602(2)(iv) precludes application of CPLR 1601 without meaningful analysis. The court also clarified that their prior decisions in Morales v County of Nassau and Cole v Mandell Food Stores did not create a non-delegable duty exception to limited liability under Article 16.