Matter of Fappiano v. New York City Police Dept., 95 N.Y.2d 744 (2000)
Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), which allows disclosure of sex crime victim information to a person “charged” with a sex offense, does not apply to individuals already convicted of such offenses seeking documents for collateral review.
Summary
Three petitioners, each convicted of sex crimes, sought to compel police departments to disclose records related to their cases via Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests. The police departments denied the requests, citing Civil Rights Law § 50-b(1), which protects the identity of sex crime victims. The petitioners argued that § 50-b(2)(a), allowing disclosure to persons “charged” with a sex offense, applied to them. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that “charged” does not include convicted individuals, and the police departments must still demonstrate that each document sought contains identifying information before denying disclosure.
Facts
Scott Fappiano was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and burglary in 1985 and sought 25 categories of police reports for a federal habeas corpus petition.
Ceasar Stapleton was convicted of rape, sodomy, and assault in 1988 and sought nine categories of reports for CPL article 440 and federal habeas corpus proceedings, even though he received similar material from the District Attorney’s Office.
Charles Doyen was convicted of sodomy and kidnapping in 1987 and requested 13 categories of documents from the New York State Police for collateral review.
Procedural History
Fappiano’s conviction and denial of his CPL article 440 motion were affirmed on appeal.
Stapleton’s conviction was affirmed, and his applications for a writ of error coram nobis and CPL article 440 motions were denied. His federal habeas corpus petition was largely denied.
Doyen’s sodomy conviction was affirmed, and kidnapping conviction was reversed on appeal.
In all three cases, the police departments denied the FOIL requests under Civil Rights Law § 50-b(1). The Supreme Court initially ordered disclosure or reinstatement of the petition in each case, and the Appellate Division affirmed, equating the petitioners to persons “charged” with a crime. The Court of Appeals then reviewed these decisions.
Issue(s)
Whether Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), which allows disclosure of sex crime victim information to a person “charged” with an offense, applies to individuals already convicted of such offenses seeking documents for collateral review.
Whether a blanket denial of a FOIL request for documents relating to a sex crime is justified under Civil Rights Law § 50-b, even if some documents do not contain information that tends to identify the victim.
Holding
No, because a person “charged” with a crime is distinctly different from someone already convicted, possessing rights such as the presumption of innocence and the right to confront accusers.
No, because Civil Rights Law § 50-b shields documents containing information that tends to identify the victim, the police departments must still show that each requested document contains such identifying information.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that statutory interpretation requires giving words their natural meaning. The term “charged” cannot be equated with “convicted,” as a person charged has different legal rights. The legislative history supports this interpretation, as the sponsor’s memorandum refers to the individual as involved at the “investigation and prosecution” stage. The Court emphasized that the constitutional right of confrontation, the sole justification for the exception in § 50-b(2)(a), does not extend to CPL article 440 motions and federal habeas corpus review.
Regarding the blanket denial, the Court stated that while Civil Rights Law § 50-b protects the privacy of sex crime victims, this does not justify denying access to documents that do not contain identifying information. The police departments must make a particularized showing as to why each document should not be disclosed. Citing Matter of John P. v Whalen, the Court noted, “the standing of one who seeks access to records under the Freedom of Information Law is as a member of the public.” Therefore, even if the petitioners knew the victim’s identity, they are treated as any other member of the public seeking access to these records.
The Court also noted that Stapleton’s petition should be dismissed because he conceded receiving most of the requested documents from the District Attorney’s Office and because he sought “serial numbers” or “lot numbers” in his Article 78 proceeding that were not originally requested in the FOIL request to the NYPD, holding that the relief sought here is academic, citing Matter of Moore v Santucci.