Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000)
Violation of a New York City Administrative Code provision constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision originates from state law.
Summary
Plaintiff sued the City of New York for negligence after falling from bleachers at a public school athletic field, alleging a violation of the New York City Building Code regarding protective guards on bleachers. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on liability, finding negligence per se. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a violation of the City’s Administrative Code is only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the code provision originates from state law. This distinction is rooted in the principle that only state statutes can alter the common law of negligence.
Facts
The plaintiff fell from bleachers at a public school athletic field owned by the City of New York after a softball game. The bleachers lacked handrails, and the plaintiff alleged the city violated section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code, which mandates protective guards on bleachers. The plaintiff claimed the absence of these guards caused his fall and subsequent injuries.
Procedural History
The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging negligence based on a violation of the City’s Building Code. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, finding negligence per se. The jury found the defendants 100% liable. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding future lost earnings but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the defendants leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
- Whether a violation of section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code constitutes negligence per se or merely some evidence of negligence.
Holding
- No, because a violation of a municipal ordinance or administrative rule constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision has its origin in State Law.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state statutes and local ordinances or administrative rules for establishing negligence. Violations of state statutes imposing specific duties constitute negligence per se, while violations of municipal ordinances are merely evidence of negligence. The court reasoned that elevating a violation of a city ordinance to negligence per se would substantially alter the state’s common law, a change more appropriately left to the Legislature. The Administrative Code itself states that its recodification should not be construed as validating any provision to state law. The court emphasized the City’s retained authority to amend or repeal its Administrative Code provisions without state legislative action, reinforcing its status as a local enactment. Quoting from Major v. Waverly & Ogden, Inc., the court stated that ” ‘has the force and effect of law does not make it so, if by that is meant that it is the equivalent of or equal to a legislative enactment. The Constitution of the State commits to the Legislature alone the power to enact a statute’…It is only to such an enactment that liability without regard to negligence may attach”. The court acknowledged that some Administrative Code sections originate in state law and might warrant statutory treatment but declined to extend statutory status to all City ordinances, as it would create uncertainty in the application of the common law. This holding aligns with Smulczeski v. City Ctr. of Music & Drama, where a violation of a lighting ordinance was deemed evidence of negligence.