People v. Prescott, 95 N.Y.2d 656 (2001)
Under New York law, attempted driving while intoxicated (DWI) and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle are not legally cognizable offenses due to the comprehensive nature of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its specific penalty scheme, which do not contemplate such attempts.
Summary
Defendant was found in the driver’s seat of a truck, keys in the ignition, attempting to start it while intoxicated. He was charged with attempted DWI and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The New York Court of Appeals held that these are not legally cognizable offenses. The Court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to create liability for attempted drunk driving, as evidenced by the detailed statutory scheme in Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides specific penalties for various degrees of DWI but lacks any provisions for attempts. Allowing such charges would disrupt this carefully crafted system and create confusion.
Facts
Jeffrey Orlando heard noises outside his home and saw Defendant in his truck, attempting to start it with the keys in the ignition. Defendant stated he wanted to use the truck to pull his own vehicle out of a ditch. Orlando believed Defendant was intoxicated. The truck was operable but hard to start, requiring specific knowledge to engage the engine.
Procedural History
The County Court dismissed the charges of attempted DWI and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation, relying on People v. Campbell. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that attempted DWI is possible because DWI proscribes conduct, not just a result, citing People v. Saunders. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether attempted driving while intoxicated is a legally cognizable offense in New York.
2. Whether attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree is a legally cognizable offense in New York.
Holding
1. No, because the Legislature did not contemplate criminal liability for attempted drunk driving, given the comprehensive nature of Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its discrete penalty scheme.
2. No, because like drunk driving, the Legislature did not contemplate an attempted offense under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511, which is part of an integrated statutory scheme with specific and well-defined penalties.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that generally, an attempt to commit a strict liability crime is not cognizable if the crime targets an unintended result, but it is cognizable if the crime targets specific conduct. While DWI appears to target conduct (“operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated”), statutory and policy considerations inform the analysis. The Court emphasized the legislative history and the comprehensive nature of Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, enacted to address drunk driving with specific penalties and procedures. “Article 31 emerged as a tightly and carefully integrated statute the sole purpose of which is to address drunk driving.” The statute’s detailed penalty scheme for various DWI offenses indicates that the Legislature did not contemplate a separate crime of attempted DWI. Creating such an offense would lead to confusion, especially regarding appropriate punishments and license sanctions. The Court also noted the broad definition of “operation” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, which encompasses conduct “dangerously close” to driving. Given this broad definition, the Legislature likely saw no need to expand sanctions to include attempted DWI. Regarding aggravated unlicensed operation, the Court found that the Legislature similarly did not intend to create attempt liability, given the specific penalties and well-defined nature of the offense within Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511.