Green v. Montgomery, 95 N.Y.2d 693 (2000)

A juvenile who initiates a civil suit placing at issue the same conduct underlying a juvenile delinquency adjudication waives the confidentiality protections of the Family Court Act, allowing the adjudication to be used for collateral estoppel purposes.

Summary

Vernon Green, a juvenile, was apprehended by police after driving a stolen vehicle. He was charged with attempted murder and reckless endangerment. The Supreme Court adjudicated Green a juvenile delinquent for reckless endangerment. Green then sued the police for excessive force in federal court. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether the juvenile delinquency adjudication could be used against Green, and whether Green waived his rights by bringing the civil suit. The Court of Appeals held that while juvenile adjudications are generally confidential, Green waived that protection by bringing a lawsuit that placed the adjudicated conduct at issue. This prevents him from using the confidentiality provisions as both a shield and a sword.

Facts

Police, acting on a tip, staked out an apartment complex parking lot where stolen cars were allegedly kept. Vernon Green, 15, arrived with friends and entered a stolen Jeep Wrangler, driving it within the parking lot. Police blocked the exits and pursued Green on foot. While attempting to escape, Green drove the Jeep towards a police officer (Montgomery). Conflicting accounts exist: Montgomery claimed Green drove at him, prompting officers to fire, wounding Green; Green claimed the officers fired without provocation as the Jeep slowed. Green was subsequently charged with attempted murder, reckless endangerment, grand larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property.

Procedural History

Green was tried in Supreme Court due to the attempted murder charge. The court found Green committed acts constituting reckless endangerment and criminal possession of stolen property, adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent. Green then filed a damages action in federal court alleging excessive force. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding Green’s claim precluded by the delinquency finding. The Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the applicability of Family Court Act confidentiality provisions and whether Green waived those rights.

Issue(s)

1. Is the New York Supreme Court’s commitment order stating that Green was “convicted of/adjudicated a Juvenile Delinquent, for the crime [] of Reckless Endangerment 1st Degree” to be treated as the equivalent of a Family Court adjudication of juvenile delinquency for the purpose of §§ 380.1 and 381.2 of the Family Court Act?

2. By bringing a § 1983 suit that places into question issues that were necessarily resolved by the Supreme Court in its decision that Green recklessly endangered Officer Montgomery, has Green waived any and all rights under New York state law not to have those determinations held against him, with the result that he can be collaterally estopped from relitigating the Supreme Court’s findings?

Holding

1. Yes, because Supreme Court’s adjudication of Green as a juvenile delinquent is to be treated as the equivalent of a Family Court determination for purposes of Family Court Act §§ 380.1 and 381.2.

2. Yes, because by bringing a civil suit that places the adjudicated conduct at issue, Green waived the confidentiality protections of the Family Court Act.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Family Court Act §§ 380.1 and 381.2 generally prohibit the use of juvenile delinquency adjudications against the juvenile in other courts, this protection can be waived. The court equated the Supreme Court’s order to a Family Court adjudication for purposes of the statute. The Court relied on the principle that privileges are not absolute and can be waived when an individual affirmatively places the protected information or conduct at issue. Referencing Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278 (1989) and Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287 (1969), the court drew an analogy to the physician-patient privilege, which is waived when a litigant places their physical or mental condition at issue in a personal injury action. The court emphasized that a party cannot use a privilege as both a shield and a sword, asserting a claim while simultaneously preventing the other party from accessing information relevant to the claim. Similarly, the court noted that the privilege of CPL 160.50, which mandates sealing of records where a criminal proceeding has been terminated in favor of the accused, may not be used “as a sword to gain an advantage in a civil action”. By initiating a civil suit alleging excessive force, Green put at issue the very conduct for which he was adjudicated delinquent, thus waiving the confidentiality protections. The Court emphasized that collateral estoppel serves to prevent the relitigation of issues already decided, ensuring fundamental fairness.