People v. Curtis, 92 N.Y.2d 544 (1998)
Custodial time under civil commitment orders pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law does not count toward the statutory time limit for dismissal of indictments under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 730.50, which applies only to time spent in custody under criminal court orders.
Summary
Curtis was indicted for manslaughter but found unfit to stand trial and committed to the Commissioner of Mental Health. Later, he was converted to civil patient status under the Mental Hygiene Law, pursuant to Jackson v. Indiana. Years later, he sought dismissal of the indictment, arguing that his total time in custody exceeded two-thirds of the maximum possible sentence, as per CPL 730.50(3) and (4). The Court of Appeals held that time spent under civil commitment does not count toward the CPL 730.50 limit, reversing the lower courts’ decisions and denying the motion to dismiss. The Court reasoned that the statute explicitly refers to custody under criminal court orders, not civil orders, and that denying dismissal does not violate equal protection or due process rights.
Facts
Curtis was indicted for manslaughter in 1981. He was found mentally incapacitated to stand trial and committed to the custody of the State Commissioner of Mental Health under CPL Article 730. In 1983, Curtis’s status was converted to civil patient status under Article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law, following Jackson v. Indiana. He remained in the Commissioner’s custody under civil commitment orders.
Procedural History
In 1998, Curtis moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing he had been in custody for longer than two-thirds of the maximum sentence, pursuant to CPL 730.50(3) and (4). The Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant, who was initially held under a criminal order of commitment but later converted to civil status under the Mental Hygiene Law pursuant to Jackson v. Indiana, is entitled to have the time spent under civil commitment counted toward the statutory limit for dismissal of the indictment under CPL 730.50(3) and (4).
Holding
No, because CPL 730.50(3) and (4) apply only to the periods prescribed in criminal orders of commitment and retention, not to time spent under civil commitment orders issued pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court focused on the statutory language of CPL 730.50(3), which refers to “the aggregate of the periods prescribed in the temporary order of commitment, the first order of retention and all subsequent orders of retention.” The Court stated: “As quoted, the statute clearly provides that not every custodial retention of an indicted defendant by the Commissioner for two thirds of the authorized imprisonment is sufficient for dismissal. It is only custody for periods ‘prescribed’ (emphasis supplied) in orders of commitment and retention that may be aggregated and counted in determining the defendant’s entitlement to dismissal of the indictment.” Because Curtis was held under civil commitment orders, he was not entitled to the benefit of CPL 730.50(3) and (4). The Court noted that “whenever the phrase ‘superior court’ is used in the Criminal Procedure Law, it refers to a court exercising criminal jurisdiction.” The Court also rejected Curtis’s arguments based on equal protection and due process, finding a rational basis for treating civilly committed defendants differently. The Court distinguished Klopfer v. North Carolina, noting that in this case, unlike in Klopfer, the People were statutorily barred from proceeding against this defendant because he was incapacitated to stand trial. Finally, the Court emphasized that Curtis had exchanged his right to automatic dismissal under CPL 730.50 for the benefits of civil commitment, which allowed for release under a less stringent standard.