95 N.Y.2d 368 (2000)
A defendant can be convicted of endangering the welfare of a child even when the harmful conduct is not specifically directed at the child, provided the defendant is aware that the conduct is likely to cause harm to the child.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s actions, though not specifically directed at children, could constitute endangering their welfare. Theodore Johnson attacked his ex-girlfriend, Vanessa Parker, in the presence of her children. The children witnessed the assault and were confined to a room while it continued. The Court held that the defendant’s conduct, though directed at Parker, knowingly created a risk of harm to the children, thus satisfying the elements of endangering the welfare of a child.
Facts
Theodore Johnson attacked his ex-girlfriend, Vanessa Parker, as she walked home with her three children. Johnson struck Parker, knocked over the baby carriage, and dragged her to her apartment. The children witnessed the attack. Inside the apartment, Johnson continued to beat Parker while the children hid in a bedroom, hearing the violence. Johnson was later arrested and threatened Parker from jail to drop the charges.
Procedural History
Johnson was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, intimidating a victim, menacing, and felonies related to an order of protection. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the convictions for endangering the welfare of a child but affirming the other convictions. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to both the People and the defendant.
Issue(s)
Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support Johnson’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child when his actions were not specifically directed at the children.
Holding
Yes, because Penal Law § 260.10(1) does not require that the harmful conduct be specifically directed at a child; it is sufficient that the defendant knowingly acted in a manner likely to be injurious to the child’s physical, mental, or moral welfare.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 260.10(1) is broad in scope and imposes a criminal sanction for the mere “likelihood” of harm to a child, provided the defendant “knowingly” acts in a manner that creates such a likelihood. The statute does not require that the conduct be specifically directed at a child; rather, the defendant must simply be aware that the conduct may likely result in harm to a child. The Court cited People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32, noting that the crime is defined by the risk of injury produced by the defendant’s conduct, not by specifically targeted acts or individuals. The Court emphasized the well-documented adverse effects of domestic violence on children, referring to the Governor’s approval of legislation addressing domestic violence in child custody determinations. The Court found that Johnson’s assaultive conduct created a likelihood of harm to the children, of which he was aware. The children witnessed the attack, were threatened, and were confined while the violence continued. The Court disapproved of prior cases that required conduct to be directly focused on the child. The court noted that each case is fact-specific, but prior case law supported the conclusion that domestic violence against a mother in the presence of a child constituted endangering the welfare of that child. In summary, the court emphasized that the focus is on the awareness of the potential for harm to the child, regardless of whether the actions were directly targeted at them.