People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997)
An erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error when the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge at the end of the selection process.
Summary
The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. He further argued that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, the erroneous denial requires reversal. One juror expressed doubt about impartiality due to the nature of the victim’s injuries. The other was a law student interning at the prosecutor’s office. The Court of Appeals held that when a defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges after an erroneous denial for cause, reversal is required, even if an additional challenge is offered, especially where the initial denials were questionable. This decision reinforces the importance of impartial jury selection and protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Facts
During jury selection, a prospective juror stated the victim’s injuries would likely prevent an impartial verdict and that she could not guarantee she would follow instructions regarding the justification defense. The defendant challenged her for cause, but the court denied the challenge. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.
Another prospective juror was a law student interning at the Queens District Attorney’s Office, the prosecuting agency in this case. The defendant challenged this juror for cause, arguing her employment created an appearance of impropriety. The court denied the challenge after the juror asserted she could be impartial. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.
The defendant exhausted his statutorily allotted peremptory challenges before the end of jury selection.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court improperly denied his challenges for cause and that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, reversal was required. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding the two prospective jurors?
2. Whether the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge?
Holding
1. The dissenting justice argued yes, because one juror demonstrated actual bias, and the other had professional ties to the prosecutor’s office.
2. Yes, because an erroneous ruling denying a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, and offering an additional challenge at the last second does not cure the error.
Court’s Reasoning
The dissenting Justice Smith argued that the trial court erred by denying the challenges for cause. He reasoned that the first juror did not provide adequate assurance of impartiality, and the second juror’s connection to the prosecutor’s office created an appearance of impropriety.
The dissent further reasoned that under CPL 270.20(2), an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error if the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges. The dissent emphasized that offering an additional peremptory challenge after the defendant has exhausted their statutory allotment does not negate the error, particularly when challenges for cause should have been granted in the first place.
The dissent cited People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 97, stating: “It is well settled that an erroneous ruling by the court, denying a challenge for cause, constitutes reversible error when the defendant peremptorily challenges the prospective juror and his peremptory challenges are exhausted before the jury selection process is complete.”
The dissent argued that it was an abuse of discretion to offer an extra peremptory challenge after eleven jurors had already been selected and the defendant had exhausted his challenges, suggesting this was an attempt to circumvent CPL 270.20(2). The dissent emphasized that reversal is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.