People v. Foster, 93 N.Y.2d 177 (1999)

The “auto stripping” statute, which prohibits the intentional destruction or defacing of any part of a vehicle, encompasses breaking a car window to steal property inside.

Summary

Foster was observed breaking a car window and stealing items from the trunk. He was convicted of auto stripping in the first degree, among other charges. Foster argued the auto stripping statute was intended to deter dismantling cars for parts, not theft. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute’s plain language, proscribing the destruction of any part of a vehicle, included breaking a car window during a theft. The Court also considered legislative history, which demonstrated a broader goal of combating auto-related crime beyond just theft of parts. The conviction was affirmed.

Facts

Officer Coviello observed Foster suspiciously surveying parked cars. Foster approached a car, broke the rear passenger window, opened the trunk, rummaged through it, and then walked away. Officers apprehended Foster, recovering stolen bridge tokens and loose change. Upon inspecting the vehicle, the rear passenger window was shattered, the glove compartment was opened, and the ashtray was pulled out.

Procedural History

Foster was indicted for auto stripping, criminal mischief, and petit larceny. The Supreme Court denied Foster’s motion to dismiss the auto stripping charge. At trial, the motion was renewed and again denied. Foster was convicted on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, modifying the sentence by deleting a fine. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the auto stripping statute, which prohibits removing or intentionally destroying or defacing any part of a vehicle, encompasses breaking a car window in order to steal property from within the vehicle.

Holding

Yes, because the plain language of the statute proscribes the destruction or defacing of any part of a vehicle, and breaking a car window during a theft falls within that definition.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court focused on the statutory language, stating, “If the words chosen have a ‘definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, [then] there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning.’” The Court found the words “destroys or defaces” clear and applicable to Foster’s actions. The Court stated, “By shattering a car window in the course of a theft, defendant ‘intentionally destroy[ed] or deface[d] [a] part of a vehicle * * * without the permission of the owner’ (Penal Law § 165.09 [1]).” The Court rejected limiting the statute to instances of removing auto parts, noting such a reading would ignore the plain language. The Court also discussed the statute’s legislative history, referencing the legislature’s efforts to eradicate the burgeoning problem of automobile-related crime and protection against “vandalism” and “damage” to motor vehicles. The Court stated that “overlapping in criminal statutes, and the opportunity for prosecutorial choice they represent, is no bar to prosecution.” The Court rejected the argument that Foster should only be prosecuted for criminal mischief since the legislature intended to set auto-related offenses apart from offenses against other types of property by imposing stiffer penalties.