Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v. City of Cohoes, 94 N.Y.2d 686 (2000)
A firefighter receiving General Municipal Law § 207-a disability payments is not entitled to a due process hearing before being ordered to report for light duty, unless the firefighter submits a conflicting medical report from their own physician.
Summary
The City of Cohoes ordered six firefighters receiving disability payments to return to light or full duty after a city physician’s evaluation. The firefighters, through their union, objected and demanded a due process hearing before returning to work, arguing they were still disabled. The Union also filed grievances and sought arbitration. The Court of Appeals held that a hearing is not required before a return-to-duty order unless the firefighter provides a conflicting medical report. The court also found that the collective bargaining agreement did not mandate arbitration of the dispute.
Facts
Six members of the City of Cohoes Fire Department were receiving disability payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a.
The City’s physician examined them and determined that five could perform light duty and one could return to full duty.
On October 31, 1997, the City ordered them to report for duty on November 10. The Union objected, requesting a due process hearing before the members were required to return. The reporting date was extended, and each firefighter received a copy of his evaluation, a description of assignment duties, and a work schedule. Only two firefighters provided medical documentation from their personal physicians supporting their claim of continued disability.
Procedural History
The firefighters and the Union initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to prevent enforcement of the orders. Supreme Court dismissed the petition for all six firefighters.
The Appellate Division modified, holding that a hearing was required before withholding benefits for the two firefighters who submitted medical documentation of continued disability.
Separately, the Union demanded arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City sought a stay of arbitration. Supreme Court granted the stay.
The Appellate Division affirmed the stay of arbitration. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the appeals, ultimately affirming the Appellate Division’s order to stay arbitration.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a firefighter receiving General Municipal Law § 207-a disability payments is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before being ordered to report for light duty based on a medical determination of capability.
2. Whether the City was compelled to submit the disputed orders to report for light duty assignments to arbitration on the Union’s demand.
Holding
1. No, because a firefighter on § 207-a status is not entitled to a hearing prior to the issuance of a report for light duty order unless they submit a report by their personal physician expressing a contrary opinion.
2. No, because the CBA did not expressly provide for arbitration regarding the applicability of the contractual rights to disabled firefighters on General Municipal Law § 207-a status in the instant dispute.
Court’s Reasoning
Regarding the due process claim, the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, considering the private interests affected, the risk of error, and the governmental interest. The Court reasoned that while firefighters have a property interest in their disability payments, they are protected by the requirement of a medical determination of capability before being ordered back to duty. Requiring the firefighter to submit a conflicting medical report before triggering a hearing is not unduly burdensome. The Court highlighted the financial implications of § 207-a payments for municipalities and the lack of a mechanism for recoupment of erroneously paid benefits. The Court cited Codd v. Velger and similar cases to support the principle that a hearing is not required until the employee raises a genuine dispute on operative facts.
Regarding arbitration, the Court acknowledged the broad arbitration clause in the CBA but emphasized its silence regarding the applicability of contractual rights to firefighters on § 207-a status. The Court relied on Matter of Chalachan v. City of Binghamton, stating, “[t]he collective bargaining agreement should not therefore be construed to implicitly expand whatever compensation rights are provided petitioners under the statute. Any additional benefits must be expressly provided for in the agreement.” Since the CBA did not expressly extend the cited benefits to § 207-a recipients, the Court held that the arbitration clause could not be construed to cover the grievances.