People v. Couser, 94 N.Y.2d 633 (2000)
The term “commanded” in the context of accomplice liability for first-degree murder, as defined in New York Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii), is not unconstitutionally vague because it has a commonly understood meaning: to direct authoritatively.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the term “commanded,” as used in the first-degree murder statute regarding accomplice liability, is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. Couser, while incarcerated, allegedly “commanded” Stanback to murder a material witness. The court held that the term “commanded” has a commonly accepted meaning, “to direct authoritatively,” and thus is not unconstitutionally vague. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, allowing the murder count against Couser to proceed to trial, finding sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury to support the indictment.
Facts
Defendant Couser, while in jail, allegedly “commanded” James Stanback to murder a material witness in Syracuse. Stanback and others attempted to carry out the murder, but mistakenly killed a relative of the witness and shot others. A Grand Jury witness, associated with Couser and Stanback, testified that Stanback said he was going to Syracuse to “take care of something” for Couser. This witness also testified he knew Couser directed Stanback to gather people to go to Syracuse to carry out the plan. Later, while incarcerated with Couser, the witness testified Couser was upset the material witness wasn’t killed and instructed the witness to deny Stanback acted on Couser’s orders.
Procedural History
The County Court dismissed the second count of the indictment against Couser, finding the term “command” unconstitutionally vague. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the term has a commonly understood meaning and meets due process standards. The Appellate Division reinstated the second count and remitted for further proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
- Whether the term “commanded” in Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the Grand Jury that Couser commanded Stanback to commit the murders.
Holding
- No, because the word “commanded” has a commonly accepted meaning: to direct authoritatively.
- Yes, because sufficient evidence was adduced before the Grand Jury to support the indictment.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or if it is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The Court relied on the common understanding of the word “command,” defining it as “to direct authoritatively”. The Court highlighted the Legislature’s specific use of “command” as distinct from other terms like “solicits,” “requests,” or “importunes,” indicating a deliberate choice to use a term with a distinct and understood meaning. The court also pointed to the lack of judicial interpretation of the term “command” over time, suggesting it is a term that is easily understood. Citing People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668, 681, the Court stated that a term is not impermissibly vague if it ” ‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’ ” The Court rejected the argument that the death penalty’s involvement necessitates a stricter Eighth Amendment analysis, as the death penalty was no longer a possibility in this case. Finally, the Court determined that sufficient evidence was presented to the Grand Jury to establish that Couser commanded Stanback to commit the murders, satisfying the requirements for indictment.