Elkin v. Roldan, 94 N.Y.2d 853 (1999)
An administrative agency has discretion to excuse a tenant’s late filing in rent stabilization proceedings, and such discretion should be exercised reasonably considering the circumstances of the delay.
Summary
Michael and Susan Elkin, and Howard Shapiro, separately challenged DHCR’s denial of their PARs, which upheld deregulation orders based on untimely income verification filings. The Elkins’ response was postmarked 10 days late, while Shapiro’s was metered four days before the deadline but postmarked three days late. The Court of Appeals held that DHCR had the discretion to excuse late filings and should reconsider the cases. The court emphasized that DHCR could consider whether the delays were excusable or so minimal as to be disregarded under the de minimis doctrine.
Facts
Michael and Susan Elkin resided in a rent-stabilized apartment. In March 1995, their landlord sent them an Income Certification Form (ICF) pursuant to luxury-decontrol provisions. They returned the form, verifying their income fell below the threshold. The landlord challenged their response, and DHCR notified them to supply income verification within 60 days. The Elkins sent two responses, both postmarked 10 days beyond the deadline. DHCR deregulated the apartment based on the untimely response. The Elkins filed a PAR, attaching an affidavit from their office manager claiming timely mailing. DHCR denied the PAR, prioritizing the postmark date.
Howard Shapiro, also a rent-stabilized tenant, received an ICF and timely returned it. The landlord challenged his certification, and DHCR notified him to submit income verification within 60 days. Shapiro’s response was metered four days before the deadline but postmarked three days after. DHCR deregulated the apartment, deeming the response untimely, noting the statutory nature of the deadline. Shapiro filed a PAR, arguing the delay was de minimis and that DHCR had prior knowledge of his income. DHCR denied the PAR.
Procedural History
The Elkins brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding no prejudice from the short delay. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding DHCR’s denial was arbitrary and capricious. Shapiro also filed an article 78 petition. Supreme Court annulled the deregulation order and remanded. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing the de minimis delay and DHCR’s prior knowledge. The Court of Appeals granted leave in both cases.
Issue(s)
1. Whether DHCR has the authority to accept filings after the 60-day deadline for income verification in luxury decontrol proceedings.
2. Whether DHCR’s denial of the PARs based on untimely filings was arbitrary and capricious, considering the circumstances of each case.
Holding
1. Yes, because DHCR has discretion to conclude that a tenant’s late filing was excusable under applicable regulations (9 NYCRR 2507.5[d]; 9 NYCRR 2527.5[d]).
2. The Court did not directly rule on whether DHCR’s denial was arbitrary and capricious; rather, it remitted the cases for reconsideration under the correct standard.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Matter of Dworman v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 94 NY2d 359, issued the same day, which rejected DHCR’s argument that it lacked the authority to accept late filings under Administrative Code § 26-504.3. The court emphasized that DHCR has discretion to determine whether a late filing is excusable. The court noted that in Elkin, the tenants presented evidence that might establish timely filing or good cause for the delay. In both cases, DHCR could consider whether the delays (three days in Shapiro and ten days in Elkin) were so minimal as to be excusable under the maxim of de minimis non curat lex. The court cited Van Clief v Van Vechten, 130 NY 571, 579 and Flora Co. v Ingilis, 233 AD2d 418, 419 as examples of applying the de minimis principle. The court did not find DHCR’s determination to be arbitrary and capricious but held that the agency should reconsider its decisions applying the appropriate legal standard. The ruling underscores the importance of administrative agencies exercising their discretion reasonably, considering all relevant circumstances and not adhering to a rigid, inflexible application of deadlines.