94 N.Y.2d 359 (1999)
An administrative agency has discretion to accept late filings and excuse defaults when a party demonstrates good cause for failing to comply with a statutory deadline, unless the statute explicitly prohibits such discretion.
Summary
This case concerns whether the New York Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) is authorized to accept late responses from rent-stabilized tenants certifying their income is below the threshold for “luxury decontrol.” The Court of Appeals held that DHCR has the authority to accept late responses if the tenant shows good cause for the delay. The Court reasoned that the relevant statute does not explicitly prohibit DHCR from accepting late filings and that legislative intent supports deciding deregulation proceedings on their merits. The court remitted two cases for DHCR to evaluate under the “good cause” standard but upheld the deregulation order in a third case where the tenant’s only excuse was inadvertent neglect.
Facts
Several tenants in rent-stabilized apartments failed to meet deadlines for providing income verification to DHCR in response to landlord petitions for deregulation under the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993. Leona Dworman responded 11 days late because she was traveling in Europe. Peter Sudarsky claimed he mistakenly sent his response to the landlord instead of DHCR. Seymour admitted she received the notice but “neglected to mail it.” In each case, DHCR issued orders of deregulation based on the tenants’ failure to comply with the 60-day deadline to respond.
Procedural History
In Dworman and Seymour, the Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court decisions and held that DHCR acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In Sudarsky, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and reinstated DHCR’s deregulation order. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in all three cases, consolidating them for review.
Issue(s)
Whether DHCR has discretion to accept late filings from tenants in luxury decontrol proceedings, or whether the 60-day response deadline in Administrative Code § 26-504.3(c)(1) is an absolute bar to considering late submissions.
Holding
Yes, DHCR has discretion to accept late filings when a tenant demonstrates good cause because the statute does not explicitly prohibit DHCR from doing so, and the Rent Stabilization Code permits acceptance of late filings for good cause. However, DHCR did not abuse its discretion in denying Seymour’s petition because “inadvertent neglect” does not constitute good cause.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that while the Act requires tenants to provide information within 60 days, it does not explicitly mandate deregulation if the response is even a single day late. The statute requires an order of deregulation only if the tenant “fail[s] to provide the information.” The Court emphasized that this implies an order should be issued only if the tenant fails to respond at all, not necessarily if the response is simply tardy.
The Court further noted that the Introducer’s Memorandum in Support of the Act indicates the Legislature intended for deregulation proceedings to be decided on their merits. The Court also pointed out DHCR’s own inconsistent adherence to deadlines, undermining its argument for strict enforcement against tenants.
The Court distinguished Matter of Mennella v Lopez-Torres and Matter of Brusco v Braun, which required strict enforcement of a five-day response deadline in eviction proceedings, because the relevant statute (RPAPL 732[3]) explicitly stated that a default must be entered if the tenant fails to answer within five days.
The Court relied on the Rent Stabilization Code, which states that DHCR may, for good cause shown, accept late filings “except where prohibited by the RSL.” Because Administrative Code § 26-504.3 does not prohibit DHCR from accepting late filings, DHCR may exercise its discretion under the Code.
The Court emphasized that DHCR is within its discretion to interpret “good cause” to mean more than “any cause” and that the discretion to excuse a default should not be viewed as an invitation to ignore filing deadlines. The Court found that DHCR did not abuse its discretion in denying Seymour’s PAR because she alleged only “inadvertent neglect.”
The Court remitted Dworman and Sudarsky to DHCR for reconsideration under the “good cause” standard. In Dworman, the Court noted that DHCR had never asked her to provide an explanation for her late filing, and on remittal, DHCR could consider whether the 11-day delay was excusable under the maxim of de minimis non curat lex. Similarly, in Sudarsky, the Court found that DHCR’s rejection of his explanation was too rigid.