94 N.Y.2d 32 (1999)
When a statute is silent on whether a private right of action exists, courts determine whether one may be fairly implied by considering if the plaintiff is part of the class the statute protects, if the private right of action would advance the legislative purpose, and if it is consistent with the legislative scheme.
Summary
The plaintiff, a student, sued the school district for failing to screen her for scoliosis as required by Education Law § 905(1). She claimed this failure delayed diagnosis, necessitating surgery. The court addressed whether § 905(1) implies a private right of action. The Court of Appeals held that while the plaintiff was within the statute’s protected class and a private right of action might promote the statute’s purpose, it was inconsistent with the legislative scheme, which provided for administrative enforcement and legislative intent to immunize the school districts from liability arising out of the scoliosis screening program. Therefore, no private right of action was implied.
Facts
The infant plaintiff attended schools within the East Greenbush Central School District. During one school year, she was not screened for scoliosis as required by Education Law § 905(1). Subsequently, she was diagnosed with scoliosis, which had progressed to a point requiring surgery, allegedly because of the delayed diagnosis due to the missed screening.
Procedural History
The plaintiff sued the school district, alleging violations of Education Law § 905(1) and common-law negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the school district, finding no private right of action under the statute and no viable negligence claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether Education Law § 905(1) implies a private right of action for students who allegedly suffer harm because the school failed to provide scoliosis screening.
Holding
No, because implying a private right of action would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme as it is evidence of the Legislature’s intent to immunize the school districts from any liability that might arise out of the scoliosis screening program. The Legislature revealed its stance when in 1994 it amended Education Law § 905 (2) in reaction to an Appellate Division ruling in Bello v Board of Educ.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court applied the three-part test from Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day to determine whether a private right of action could be implied. The court acknowledged the plaintiff was in the class the statute aimed to protect. It also conceded that allowing a private right of action could encourage compliance and advance the statute’s purpose of early scoliosis detection. However, the Court emphasized that the third prong—consistency with the legislative scheme—weighed against implying a private right of action. The Court reasoned that Education Law § 911 expressly charges the Commissioner of Education with the duty to implement Education Law § 905 (1) and has equipped the Commissioner with authority to adopt rules and regulations for such purpose. The Court noted that the Legislature had granted the Commissioner of Education the power to enforce the statute and had expressed concern over costs to school districts, enacting Education Law § 905(2) to immunize them from liability. This provision, coupled with the administrative enforcement mechanism, indicated the Legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action. The court further reasoned that allowing private rights of action against government has direct and obvious financial consequences to the public. As a result, the court held that the legislative scheme was inconsistent with a private right of action. The court addressed the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim, stating, “Plaintiffs contend that the lower courts erred in holding that they failed to state a claim for common-law negligence. Essentially, plaintiffs argue that the District assumed a duty to the infant plaintiff and her parents by creating a special relationship with them in connection with the Education Law § 905 (1) program and that it breached its duty by failing to perform the examination during the 1993-1994 school year. We agree with the courts below that plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law to state a claim for common-law negligence”.