People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999)

When an error affects some counts in a multi-count indictment, the remaining counts are reversed only if there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the jury’s verdict on those counts in a meaningful way; the prosecution is not required to disclose information that the defendant knew or should have known.

Summary

Doshi, a psychiatrist, was convicted on multiple counts related to the illegal sale of controlled substances. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that good faith was irrelevant for four counts concerning lorazepam 2.5 mg. The Appellate Division vacated these counts, but Doshi argued this error tainted the remaining convictions. The Court of Appeals held that the error did not warrant reversal of the remaining counts because the jury was properly instructed on the element of good faith for those charges, and the jury acquitted on other counts. The Court also found no Brady violation, as Doshi knew of the Medicaid records he claimed were improperly withheld.

Facts

Doshi, a psychiatrist, was accused of illegally selling controlled substances and prescriptions. Sara Cordova, a former addict and police informant, testified that she purchased drugs from Doshi for resale, and that Doshi was aware of this. Thomas Creelman, an undercover agent, also purchased drugs from Doshi. Doshi claimed he acted in good faith as a psychiatrist. He was convicted on multiple counts, but the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that “good faith” was irrelevant for counts related to lorazepam 2.5 mg.

Procedural History

The trial court convicted Doshi. Doshi moved to vacate the judgment, arguing a Brady violation. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate but reversed four counts relating to lorazepam 2.5 mg. Doshi appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on four counts of the indictment had a prejudicial “spillover effect” on the remaining counts, requiring reversal of those convictions.

2. Whether the People’s failure to turn over certain Medicaid records constituted a violation of the People’s disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland.

Holding

1. No, because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial judge’s erroneous charge influenced the jury’s decision to convict on the remaining counts.

2. No, because Brady does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature.

Court’s Reasoning

1. The Court applied the standard from People v. Baghai-Kermani, focusing on whether there was a “reasonable possibility” that the jury’s decision to convict on the tainted counts influenced its guilty verdict on the remaining counts in a “meaningful way.” The Court found the tainted counts distinguishable because the jury was specifically instructed that “good faith” was irrelevant for the lorazepam 2.5 mg counts, while the remaining counts required a showing of absence of “good faith.” The Court also noted the jury acquitted Doshi on five other counts, demonstrating they were capable of distinguishing between the charges.

2. The Court stated that the Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to turn over material exculpatory evidence to defendants but does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature. The billing statements were generated by Doshi himself when he submitted claims to Medicaid. The Court found that Doshi knew of the Medicaid payment records because he billed Medicaid and received payment, thus, the People had no obligation to disclose them. As stated in the opinion, “the existence of the Medicaid payment records was necessarily known to defendant by virtue of his having billed Medicaid and received payment.”