People v. Smith, 93 N.Y.2d 354 (1999)

Negative identification evidence is admissible to bolster the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the reliability of that identification is at issue.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of negative identification testimony and the elements of first-degree bail jumping. The Court held that negative identification evidence is admissible to enhance the reliability of an eyewitness identification. However, the Court also found that the defendant was improperly convicted of first-degree bail jumping because the court order requiring his appearance was not explicitly connected to a pending indictment, reducing the conviction to second-degree bail jumping.

Facts

Detective Brown, an undercover officer, participated in a buy/bust operation and identified Smith as the “steerer.” Another suspect was apprehended wearing similar clothing to the steerer. Detective Brown stated that this person was not the steerer. Smith was initially released on his own recognizance with a condition to appear. After an indictment, he failed to appear in Supreme Court and was subsequently indicted for first-degree bail jumping.

Procedural History

Smith was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance and first-degree bail jumping. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether negative identification testimony is admissible as evidence-in-chief to bolster the reliability of an eyewitness identification.
2. Whether Smith’s conviction for first-degree bail jumping was proper, given that the initial order to appear was not explicitly connected to a pending indictment.

Holding

1. Yes, because negative identification testimony is relevant when the reliability of an eyewitness identification is at issue, and it enhances the credibility of the witness’s identification.
2. No, because the order requiring Smith’s appearance was not explicitly connected to a pending indictment for a Class A or B felony, a necessary element for first-degree bail jumping.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that negative identification evidence enhances the likelihood of an accurate eyewitness identification. It serves the same purpose as other forms of out-of-court identification evidence, such as videotaped lineups or prior descriptions. The Court noted, “[w]hen the reliability of an eyewitness identification is at issue, negative identification evidence can tend to prove that the eyewitness possessed the ability to distinguish the particular features of the perpetrator.”

Regarding the bail jumping charge, the Court emphasized the specific elements of Penal Law § 215.57, which defines first-degree bail jumping. The critical element missing was a court order requiring Smith to appear specifically in connection with a pending indictment for a Class A or B felony. The initial order was connected to a felony complaint, not an indictment. Since no new securing order was issued after the indictment, Smith could only be guilty of second-degree bail jumping. The Court stated, “[f]irst degree bail jumping is set apart from the lesser offenses in that the court order that the defendant violated must have conditioned his release from custody, or continued liberty, on his appearance in connection with a pending indictment for an A or B felony.”