93 N.Y.2d 242 (1999)
A judge who presided over the original trial may also preside over a reconstruction hearing to settle the record without violating due process or confrontation rights, unless a direct, personal, substantial, or pecuniary interest in the outcome, or a clash in judicial roles exists.
Summary
This case addresses whether a judge who presided over the original trial can also preside over a reconstruction hearing when trial minutes are lost. The New York Court of Appeals held that it is permissible, finding no violation of due process or confrontation rights unless the judge has a direct interest in the outcome or there is a conflict in judicial roles. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where the judge acted as complainant, indicter, and prosecutor. The Court emphasized that the judge’s role in a reconstruction hearing is to ensure the accuracy of the record.
Facts
In People v. Alomar, the defendant was convicted of murder, but the voir dire minutes were lost, prompting a reconstruction hearing. The trial judge, who also presided over the original trial, stated his intent to rely on his own recollection, leading to the defendant’s objection and a motion for recusal. In People v. Morales, the defendant was convicted of attempted robbery, and the accuracy of the trial transcript regarding the reasonable doubt charge was disputed. A reconstruction hearing was ordered, and the defendant moved for recusal of the trial judge.
Procedural History
In Alomar, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge presiding over the reconstruction hearing. A dissenting judge argued that the trial judge was a witness to the proceedings. In Morales, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision not to recuse itself and upheld the resettled transcript. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether presiding over both the original trial and a reconstruction hearing violates a defendant’s due process rights to a neutral judge, a fair hearing, and the right to confront witnesses.
Holding
No, because the judge’s role in a reconstruction hearing is to ensure the accuracy of the record, and this does not create a conflict of interest or violate due process or confrontation rights unless a direct, personal, substantial, or pecuniary interest in the outcome, or a clash in judicial roles exists.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court distinguished In re Murchison, where the judge acted as complainant, indicter, prosecutor, and judge. Here, the judges were merely fulfilling their judicial role in ensuring the accuracy of the record (CPL 460.70[1]; CPLR 5525[c], [d]; Judiciary Law § 7-a). Recusal is required only when a direct, personal, substantial, or pecuniary interest exists (Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523), or where a clash in judicial roles is present. The Court stated that bias alleged here falls short of requiring recusal, quoting “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness” (In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136). Further, the court found that the trial judge wasn’t a witness “against” the defendants, but instead was working to clarify what originally took place, distinguishing this case from Tyler v. Swenson (427 F.2d 412) and Lillie v. United States (953 F.2d 1188) where the propriety of the judge’s prior conduct was at issue or the judge engaged in off-the-record fact-finding. The Court concluded that in a reconstruction hearing, the trial judge is the final arbiter of the record certifying what took place below, and is not a witness against the accused.