93 N.Y.2d 34 (1999)
A plaintiff seeking to avoid the limitations on liability for noneconomic damages under CPLR Article 16 must plead and prove an exception to the statute; failure to do so precludes raising the issue on appeal.
Summary
Plaintiff was injured when a security gate fell on him while entering a supermarket owned by Mandell. He sued Mandell, who then brought a third-party claim against United Steel, the gate’s manufacturer. The jury found both liable, apportioning 20% fault to Mandell and 80% to United Steel. The court allowed plaintiff to recover the full judgment from Mandell. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Mandell had a nondelegable duty, an exception to the rule limiting liability to the percentage of fault. The Court of Appeals held that because plaintiff failed to plead this exception as required by CPLR 1603, he could not raise it on appeal.
Facts
Plaintiff was entering a Key Food supermarket owned by Mandell when a metal security gate fell and injured him. The gate was designed and manufactured by United Steel Products. Plaintiff sued Mandell for negligence; Mandell then commenced a third-party action against United Steel for contribution. The plaintiff never sued United Steel directly.
Procedural History
The case was bifurcated. The jury found Mandell and United Steel jointly liable, apportioning 20% of the fault to Mandell and 80% to United Steel, and awarded damages to the plaintiff. Mandell and United Steel moved to limit Mandell’s liability for noneconomic loss to its 20% share. Supreme Court denied the motion, allowing plaintiff to recover the full judgment from Mandell. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Mandell was not liable for noneconomic loss beyond its share because plaintiff hadn’t pleaded an exception to CPLR Article 16. The Court granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a plaintiff seeking to recover noneconomic damages from a defendant whose liability is 50% or less must plead and prove an exception to CPLR Article 16 to avoid the limitation of liability.
Holding
Yes, because CPLR 1603 explicitly requires a party asserting an exception to Article 16 to plead and prove it. Failure to do so precludes raising the exception on appeal.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court relied on the plain language of CPLR 1603, which states that a party asserting an exception to the limitations on liability in Article 16 must “allege and prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that the exception applies. The Court emphasized that pleadings must provide adequate notice to the adverse party to allow them to prepare a defense. The Court stated, “Indeed, it is elementary that the primary function of a pleading is to apprise an adverse party of the pleader’s claim and to prevent surprise.” Because the plaintiff never pleaded the nondelegable duty exception, Mandell was prejudiced by being unable to prepare a defense based on that theory. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the omission was harmless, finding that it deprived Mandell of the opportunity to adjust its trial strategy. Regarding the cross-appeal, the court found that res ipsa loquitur was correctly applied, stating “Supreme Court properly submitted to the jury the case against Mandell under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur”. The Court reinforced the requirement of adequate notice to allow for proper defense preparation and strategy.