92 N.Y.2d 1014 (1998)
CPLR 205(a)’s six-month tolling period begins to run when a party’s sole non-discretionary appeal is exhausted, and the pursuit of further discretionary appeals does not forestall the commencement of this period.
Summary
Lehman Brothers commenced a legal malpractice action in New York after a similar action in Texas was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Lehman Brothers argued that the New York statute of limitations was tolled under CPLR 205(a) due to the prior Texas action. The New York Court of Appeals held that even assuming CPLR 205(a) applied, the New York action was untimely because it was commenced more than six months after the termination of the Texas action, which the court defined as the exhaustion of non-discretionary appeals. The pursuit of discretionary appeals did not extend the tolling period.
Facts
Lehman Brothers, Inc. sued Hughes Hubbard & Reed in New York for legal malpractice, alleging incomplete advice on Texas law. Lehman Brothers had previously filed the same claim in Texas, but it was dismissed on December 16, 1992, for lack of personal jurisdiction due to Hughes Hubbard & Reed’s lack of minimum contacts with Texas. Lehman Brothers appealed to the Texas State Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal on June 1, 1995. Lehman Brothers’ request for a rehearing was denied on July 13, 1995. The Texas Supreme Court denied discretionary review on November 22, 1995, and a subsequent request for rehearing on January 11, 1996. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 10, 1996. Lehman Brothers then filed the New York action on July 11, 1996.
Procedural History
Lehman Brothers initially filed suit in Texas, which was dismissed by the Texas District Court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Texas State Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied further review. Lehman Brothers then filed suit in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Supreme Court granted Hughes Hubbard & Reed’s motion to dismiss, finding the action time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the present action was timely commenced in New York under CPLR 205(a) when the same action was previously dismissed in Texas for lack of personal jurisdiction, given that the New York action was commenced more than six months after the intermediate Texas appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but within six months of the U.S. Supreme Court denying certiorari.
Holding
No, because the six-month tolling period under CPLR 205(a) began to run when Lehman Brothers’ sole non-discretionary Texas appeal was exhausted, and the subsequent pursuit of discretionary appeals to the Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court did not toll the commencement of that period.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on when the Texas action terminated for purposes of CPLR 205(a). It cited Cohoes Hous. Auth. v Ippolito-Lutz, Inc., stating that a party cannot extend the statutory six-month period by continually pursuing discretionary appellate review. The court distinguished between appeals taken as a matter of right and discretionary appeals, noting that the six-month period begins when the prior action has terminated, which occurs after the exhaustion of non-discretionary appeals. In this case, the Texas action terminated on June 1, 1995, when the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Lehman Brothers’ subsequent attempts to seek discretionary review from the Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court did not delay the start of the six-month tolling period. Since the New York action was filed on July 11, 1996, more than six months after the termination of the Texas proceeding, it was deemed untimely. The court stated, “It is not the purpose of CPLR 205 (a) to permit a party to continually extend the statutory period by seeking additional discretionary appellate review.”