O’Connell v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 573 (1998)
Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a defendant can avoid liability if the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of their injuries, even if the work involved altering a building or structure.
Summary
O’Connell, an employee of Alpha TeleConnect, was injured when he fell from a ladder while installing computer and telephone cable at Hagedorn & Company. The Court of Appeals held that while O’Connell was engaged in “altering” the building within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), the Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on proximate cause. A reasonable jury could have concluded that O’Connell’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries, thus precluding liability under the statute. The Court also found error in directing a verdict against Hagedorn’s third-party claim for common-law indemnification against Alpha. The case was remitted for a new trial.
Facts
O’Connell, an employee of Alpha TeleConnect, Inc., was injured while working at premises leased by Hagedorn & Company. His task involved running computer and telephone cable from an existing computer room to newly leased space, which would be used as a telecommunications center. This required him to stand on a ladder and access holes in the ceiling to pull wiring through “canals” made in chicken wire.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court found that O’Connell was “altering” the building within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) and directed a verdict in favor of O’Connell on the issue of proximate cause at the close of his case. The Supreme Court also directed a verdict for third-party defendant Alpha on Hagedorn’s claim for common-law indemnification. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the judgment for the plaintiffs, reinstated Hagedorn’s third-party complaint, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for a new trial.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the plaintiff’s work constituted “altering” a building or structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?
2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of proximate cause?
3. Whether the Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for the third-party defendant Alpha on Hagedorn’s claim for common-law indemnification?
Holding
1. Yes, because the plaintiff’s work involved “making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure.”
2. Yes, because a reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
3. Yes, because there were questions of fact as to whether Alpha properly supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff was engaged in “altering” the building or structure, citing Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465, noting the work involved “making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure,” not a simple, routine activity. However, the Court found that Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on proximate cause. The Court reasoned that a reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries, referencing Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 524. This is a critical distinction in Labor Law § 240(1) cases: even if the statute applies, the defendant is not liable if the plaintiff’s own actions were the only cause of the accident.
The Court also held that Supreme Court erred in directing a verdict for Alpha on Hagedorn’s claim for common-law indemnification. The Court stated that “on this record, there are questions of fact as to whether Alpha properly supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff,” citing Felker v Corning Inc., 90 NY2d 219, 226. The Court rejected the Supreme Court’s reasoning that Hagedorn’s disposal of the ladder was relevant to those questions.