People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d 270 (1997)

A convicted sex offender does not have a discrete right to appeal a risk level determination made pursuant to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (Megan’s Law) under the Criminal Procedure Law.

Summary

This case addresses whether convicted sex offenders can directly appeal a court’s determination of their risk level classification under Megan’s Law. The New York Court of Appeals held that no such right exists within the framework of the Criminal Procedure Law. The Court reasoned that the risk level determination is not part of the original criminal action or sentence, but rather a post-sentence regulatory consequence. Because neither Megan’s Law nor the Criminal Procedure Law provides for a direct criminal appeal from such determinations, the appeals were properly dismissed.

Facts

Darryl Stevens pleaded guilty to attempted rape in 1990 and was sentenced to imprisonment. After his release in 1996, the County Court designated him a level three sexually violent predator under Megan’s Law, requiring him to register as a sex offender. Bernard Smith pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in 1993 and was similarly classified as a level three offender upon his release.

Procedural History

Both Stevens and Smith appealed their risk level classifications to the Appellate Division, arguing that the Megan’s Law determination was an additional condition on their original sentences. The Appellate Division dismissed their appeals, holding that the risk level determination was not an amended sentence or resentence and therefore not appealable under the Criminal Procedure Law. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a risk level determination under Megan’s Law constitutes a final disposition of the original criminal sentence, thereby granting a right of appeal.
2. Whether the Legislature can curtail appellate jurisdiction from final judgments or orders in criminal actions.

Holding

1. No, because the risk level determination is a consequence of the conviction but not a part of the criminal action or its final adjudication.
2. No, the Legislature cannot curtail the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of conviction; however, this principle does not create a right to appeal where no statute provides for one.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that a risk level determination under Megan’s Law is predominantly regulatory, designed to protect the public from recidivism. The Court emphasized that a judgment incorporates both the conviction and the sentence, terminating the criminal action. The risk level determination occurs post-sentence and is not a part of the original judgment. The court stated that “the discrete risk level determinations are a consequence of convictions for sex offenses, but are not a part of the criminal action or its final adjudication”.

The Court acknowledged that while Article VI, § 4(k) of the New York Constitution prohibits legislative curtailment of Appellate Division jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments, this only applies when a statutory right to appeal already exists. The Court found that neither Megan’s Law nor the Criminal Procedure Law provides a statutory basis for a direct criminal appeal from a risk level determination. The court stated that it could not “create a right to appeal out of thin air”.

The Court also addressed policy arguments for allowing appeals of risk level determinations but stated that such policy concerns do not substitute for legislative authorization. The court deferred deciding whether a court making post-sentence risk level assessments is acting qua court or as a distinct quasi-regulatory entity.