People v. Machado, 90 N.Y.2d 187 (1997)
A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction on Rosario grounds via a CPL 440.10 motion, whether made before or after direct appeal, must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Rosario violation.
Summary
Machado was convicted of kidnapping and felony assault. Prior to the exhaustion of his direct appeal, he brought a CPL 440.10 motion alleging a Rosario violation based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose a police report. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that because the CPL 440.10 motion was filed before the direct appeal was exhausted, the violation itself required reversal (per se error). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prejudice standard of CPL 440.10(1)(f) applies uniformly to Rosario claims raised in CPL 440.10 motions, regardless of whether the motion is made before or after direct appeal.
Facts
Machado seized his estranged wife, Lydia Machado, and forced her into his van. As he drove away, her brother, Edwin Morales, was dragged and fatally injured. Machado drove around with his wife, assaulting her. He was apprehended and charged with murder, kidnapping, and assault. At trial, Detective Russell, who investigated Morales’s death, testified for the People. The People did not disclose a report authored by Detective Russell, which contained a summary stating that Mrs. Machado sustained minor injuries and refused medical aid.
Procedural History
The jury acquitted Machado of murder and assault with a dangerous instrument but convicted him of kidnapping and felony assault. Machado appealed, arguing a Rosario violation based on the withheld Russell Report. The Appellate Division denied his motion to enlarge the record to include the report. While the appeal was pending, Machado filed a CPL 440.10 motion arguing that a “per se error” standard applied because the motion was made before his direct appeal was exhausted. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, suggesting the Rosario claim be raised in a CPL 440.10 motion. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Supreme Court denied Machado’s CPL 440.10 motion, finding the report wasn’t Rosario material and that Machado hadn’t demonstrated prejudice. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Rosario material and applying a per se error standard, vacating the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the People’s leave application.
Issue(s)
Whether the per se error rule or the prejudice standard applies to Rosario violations raised by CPL 440.10 motions made before a defendant’s direct appeal has been exhausted.
Holding
No, because the unambiguous terms of CPL 440.10 (1)(f) require that a defendant making a CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction on Rosario grounds demonstrate prejudice resulting from the violation, regardless of when the motion is made relative to the direct appeal.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 440.10(1)(f) explicitly requires a showing of prejudice for vacating a judgment based on improper conduct. The court emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation, stating that courts cannot broaden the scope of the remedy beyond what the Legislature specified. To apply a per se rule for pre-appeal 440.10 motions while requiring prejudice for post-appeal motions would give the word “prejudicial” two different meanings in the same statute. The Court acknowledged society’s interest in the finality of judgments, which is a key consideration in CPL 440.10 motions. The Court found that a uniform standard for CPL 440.10 motions, requiring a showing of prejudice (a “reasonable possibility” that the nondisclosure materially contributed to the verdict), adequately balances fairness to defendants and the need for the People to fulfill their disclosure obligations.