People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769 (1997)

New York’s disorderly conduct statute, Penal Law § 240.20(3), is constitutional because it applies to words and conduct that create a risk of public disorder and requires a culpable mental state, distinguishing it from statutes that regulate pure speech.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of New York’s disorderly conduct statute, Penal Law § 240.20(3), affirming the defendant’s conviction. The defendant was arrested after uttering obscenities at a police officer, shoving him, and then engaging in a scuffle with bar patrons after attempting to re-enter a bar. The Court found that the statute, which prohibits the use of abusive or obscene language with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, is not overbroad or vague because it targets conduct creating a risk of public disorder, not protected speech. The court distinguished this statute from the one struck down in People v. Dietze, emphasizing the requirement of a culpable mental state and the focus on preventing public disturbances.

Facts

A police officer observed Tichenor outside a bar. Tichenor uttered an obscenity at the officer and spat on the ground near his feet. Tichenor then shoved the officer while continuing to use obscene language. As the officer attempted to arrest Tichenor, a group of people gathered in the doorway of the bar, yelling at the officer. Tichenor then pulled away and re-entered the bar. The officer followed, and a scuffle ensued with bar patrons joining in. Tichenor was eventually arrested after other officers arrived.

Procedural History

Tichenor was convicted in Saratoga Springs City Court of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. He was acquitted of harassment. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Tichenor leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Penal Law § 240.20(3), the disorderly conduct statute, is unconstitutional under the State and Federal Constitutions for violating free speech, and being vague or overbroad.
2. Whether the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Tichenor because his confrontation with the officer was a private encounter and whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Holding

1. No, because the disorderly conduct statute applies to words and conduct creating a risk of public disorder and requires a culpable mental state, distinguishing it from statutes regulating pure speech.
2. No, because the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that Tichenor intended to cause and incite a public disturbance.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the disorderly conduct statute is constitutional, reaffirming prior decisions upholding similar statutes. The Court distinguished People v. Dietze, where a harassment statute was struck down, by emphasizing that the disorderly conduct statute requires intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof. This requirement, coupled with the objective standard of public disturbance, narrows the statute’s scope and prevents it from being applied to pure speech. The Court stated that “the statutory requirement that the defendant possess an intent ‘to cause, or recklessly create a risk of, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, narrows the definition, so that no inadvertent * * * act may be punished’.” The Court also rejected Tichenor’s argument that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to him, finding that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that he intended to cause a public disturbance, noting that “[d]isorderly conduct occurs when a person, with intent to cause a public annoyance or alarm in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language (Penal Law § 240.20 [3]).” The Court emphasized that the events leading to the arrest, including the gathering of bar patrons and the ensuing scuffle, supported the inference that Tichenor intended to incite a public disturbance. The court further reasoned that “the fact that the defendant slipped away from the officer’s grasp and reentered the bar after the street confrontation further supports a ready inference that the defendant intended to cause a ‘public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.’”