People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 1000 (1993)
A prior felony conviction, including a Vehicle and Traffic Law felony, can serve as a predicate felony to enhance the severity of punishment for a subsequent Penal Law felony.
Summary
The defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender after pleading guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance. He argued that his two prior Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) felony convictions should not have been considered predicate felonies under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the statute does not require a prior felony to be defined by the Penal Law to be considered a predicate felony. The court emphasized that the Legislature intended to include *any* prior felony conviction to enhance punishment for subsequent Penal Law felonies, serving an important deterrent purpose.
Facts
The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
Prior to this conviction, the defendant had two felony convictions under the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
The sentencing court classified the defendant as a second felony offender based on these prior VTL felony convictions.
The defendant challenged this classification, arguing that VTL felonies are not predicate felonies for sentencing purposes under the Penal Law.
Procedural History
The trial court sentenced the defendant as a second felony offender.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing was improper.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) requires that a prior felony be defined by the Penal Law to be considered a predicate felony for sentencing a defendant as a second felony offender.
Holding
No, because the express language of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) does not require the prior felony to be one defined by the Penal Law. The omission of restrictive language indicates that the Legislature intended to include any prior felony conviction as a predicate felony.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i), which defines a predicate felony conviction without specifying that it must be a felony defined in the Penal Law. The court contrasted this subdivision with Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (a), which explicitly limits second felony offender status to individuals who commit a “felony defined in this chapter.” The court reasoned that this distinction indicates a deliberate legislative choice to treat *any* prior felony as a predicate for enhancing punishment under § 70.06 (1) (b) (i). The court noted the legislative intent to punish repeat offenders more harshly, emphasizing the deterrent effect of the statute.
The court stated, “Rather, the specific omission of any restrictive language preceding the definition of what constitutes a ‘predicate felony conviction’ for sentencing purposes indicates that the Legislature intended to include any prior felony conviction, including a Vehicle and Traffic Law felony, as a predicate felony to enhance the severity of punishment.”
The court also cited *People v. Clearwater*, *Haag v. Ward*, and *Dillard v. La Vallee* in support of its holding, underscoring the consistency of this interpretation with existing case law.