People v. Trainor, 86 N.Y.2d 544 (1995)

New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 20.40(4)(f) allows prosecution of an offense committed on a common carrier in any county the carrier passes through, regardless of whether the location of the crime is ascertainable.

Summary

Defendant was prosecuted in New York County for offenses committed on a commuter train from Westchester to New York City. The Court of Appeals addressed whether CPL 20.40(4)(f) authorized prosecution in New York County, given the offenses occurred wholly in Westchester County. The Court held that New York County was a proper venue, interpreting the common carrier exception to venue broadly. It distinguished the private vehicle exception, emphasizing the historical application and plain language of the common carrier rule, which allows for prosecution in any county the common carrier passes through, regardless of where the crime occurred.

Facts

In March 1993, the defendant boarded a Metro-North commuter train from Westchester County to New York City. He presented a suspicious weekly pass to the conductor, who later determined it was a forgery after further inspection. The conductor seized the forged pass while the train was still in Westchester County. The defendant was subsequently arrested upon arrival in New York City.

Procedural History

The defendant was tried and convicted in New York County for criminal possession of a forged instrument and theft of services. At the close of the prosecution’s case, the defendant moved for dismissal, arguing improper venue. The trial court initially granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed, reinstating the verdict. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether CPL 20.40(4)(f) permits prosecution in New York County for offenses committed on a commuter train when the offenses occurred entirely in Westchester County?
2. Does the ruling in People v. Moore, which limits the private vehicle exception to situations where the crime’s location is indeterminable, also apply to the common carrier exception under CPL 20.40(4)(f)?

Holding

1. Yes, because the plain language of CPL 20.40(4)(f) allows prosecution in any county through which the common carrier passes during the trip.
2. No, because the common carrier exception has a distinct historical basis and the statute’s plain language does not support such a limitation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that CPL 20.40(4)(f) authorized prosecution in New York County based on the statute’s plain language. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Moore, which restricted the “private vehicle exception” to situations where the location of the crime could not be determined. The Court emphasized the historical context of the common carrier exception, noting its existence since 1877 and its consistent application to all offenses committed on common carriers, regardless of whether the crime’s location was ascertainable. The Court noted that the 1877 law specified that indictment, trial, conviction and sentencing could take place “in any such county, in the same manner and with the like effect as in the county where the offense or crime was committed”. The Court reasoned that there was no basis to conclude that the drafters of CPL 20.40(4)(f) intended to depart from the historical meaning and application of the common carrier exception.

The Court explained: “Our unwillingness to expand the scope of Moore is largely due to the absence of any support for such a limitation in the plain, unambiguous language of section 20.40 (4) (f) itself.” The Court also pointed out that the private vehicle exception, unlike the common carrier exception, had no counterpart in prior law, further justifying a narrower interpretation.