Korn v. Levitt, 83 N.Y.2d 779 (1994)
A claim against a hospital for failing to properly safeguard its blood supply from HIV contamination sounds in negligence, not medical malpractice, when the challenged conduct is not linked to the medical treatment of a particular patient.
Summary
Korn received blood transfusions at Lenox Hill Hospital, contracting HIV from tainted blood. Her estate sued, alleging negligence in failing to adequately screen the blood supply. The hospital argued the claim was time-barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The New York Court of Appeals held the claim sounded in negligence, not malpractice, because it challenged the hospital’s general blood-collection procedures, not medical treatment of Korn. The statute of limitations began to run when Korn discovered her HIV status, making the suit timely. The case highlights the distinction between negligence and malpractice in hospital settings.
Facts
Dale Korn was treated at Lenox Hill Hospital from October 1984 to January 1985 for a bowel obstruction, receiving multiple blood transfusions. Some blood was from the hospital’s blood bank, some from the New York Blood Center. At least one unit was HIV-contaminated. Korn was diagnosed with AIDS in May 1990 and died in June 1990.
Procedural History
In March 1991, Korn’s estate sued the hospital for negligence in screening and testing blood. The hospital argued the claim was time-barred by the 2.5-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. The Supreme Court struck the hospital’s defense, finding the claim sounded in negligence, subject to a 3-year statute of limitations accruing upon discovery of the injury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a hospital’s alleged failure to properly safeguard its blood supply from HIV contamination constitutes medical malpractice or ordinary negligence for purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations.
Holding
Yes, the claim sounds in negligence because the challenged conduct was not linked to the medical treatment of a particular patient but rather concerned the hospital’s general procedures for blood collection. Thus, the action was timely.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals distinguished between medical malpractice and negligence, noting that malpractice is a species of negligence. Not every negligent act by a hospital constitutes malpractice. A claim sounds in medical malpractice when the challenged conduct “constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.” (Bleiler v Bodnar, 65 NY2d 65, 72). Conversely, a claim sounds in negligence when “the gravamen of the complaint is not negligence in furnishing medical treatment to a patient, but the hospital’s failure in fulfilling a different duty.” (Id. at 73). Here, the complaint challenged the hospital’s failure to adopt proper procedures for blood collection, a duty independent of the medical treatment provided to Korn. The court stated: “Unlike the inquiry in a medical malpractice case, whether the Hospital breached its duty to exercise due care in its blood-collection activities does not in any measure depend on an analysis of the medical treatment furnished to Korn.” Although a physician must supervise blood collection, this requirement does not transform the claim into one for medical malpractice. Expert testimony might be needed to explain the technical aspects of blood collection, but that does not automatically make it a malpractice case. The Court noted that a similar claim against an independent blood bank would be considered negligence, not malpractice.