Gross v. New York Newsday, 623 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1993)
In a defamation action, whether a statement is one of fact or opinion depends on whether a reasonable reader or listener would understand the complained-of assertion as opinion or a statement of fact, considering the context of the entire publication.
Summary
Gross sued New York Newsday for defamation over a statement in an editorial that he “admits he doesn’t expect to win and is relieved by the prospect” of losing an election. Newsday moved for summary judgment, arguing the statement was opinion. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a reasonable reader would interpret the statement as opinion, especially considering the editorial’s context and tenor. Additionally, Gross, as a public figure, failed to prove Newsday acted with actual malice.
Facts
Gross, a candidate for the New York State Assembly, was the subject of an editorial in New York Newsday. The editorial evaluated candidates and stated that Gross “admits he doesn’t expect to win and is relieved by the prospect.” Gross conceded that he told a reporter he had children in college and the Assembly salary was $57,000. However, he denied saying he would be relieved to lose. The published editorial used the word “admits,” while an earlier draft used the word “seems.”
Procedural History
Gross sued New York Newsday for defamation in the Supreme Court, which granted Newsday’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint. The Appellate Division granted Newsday leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s reversal was proper.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the allegedly defamatory statement is one of fact or opinion.
2. Whether the plaintiff, a public figure, demonstrated that the defendant acted with actual malice.
Holding
1. No, because a reasonable reader would interpret the statement as an opinion when viewed within the context of the entire editorial.
2. No, because the plaintiff did not demonstrate with convincing clarity that the defendant acted with knowledge that the allegedly defamatory statement was false or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that determining whether a statement is fact or opinion is a question of law, depending on how a reasonable reader would perceive it. The court considered the context of the statement, noting its appearance on the editorial page and the editorial’s overall tenor, which included an assertion that Gross “hasn’t a clue about government.” The court emphasized that Newsday did not directly quote Gross but used “admits,” signaling an interpretation of his words. Because opinions are protected from defamation claims, summary judgment was appropriate. The court cited Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 381, stating the test is “whether a reasonable reader or listener would understand the complained-of assertions as opinion or statements of fact”. Moreover, the Court found Gross, as a public figure, failed to demonstrate actual malice. “The substitution of ‘admits’ in the published version of the editorial, for ‘seems,’ which appeared in an earlier draft, does not, by itself, demonstrate that defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with the knowledge that the statement was untrue.” The court referenced New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279-280, 285-286, regarding the actual malice standard.