In re Yolanda D., 88 N.Y.2d 790 (1996)
A person can be considered “legally responsible” for a child’s care in child protective proceedings, even if they are not the child’s parent or legal guardian, if they act as the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial or household setting.
Summary
The Orange County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated child protective proceedings against the appellant, Yolanda D.’s uncle, alleging he sexually abused her during visits to his home. The Family Court found the appellant to be a “person legally responsible” for Yolanda’s care and adjudged Yolanda an abused child. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellant was a person legally responsible because he acted as the functional equivalent of a parent during the relevant time, even though he was not a formal custodian or guardian. The court emphasized the frequency and nature of contact, the control he exercised over the child’s environment, and the duration of the contact.
Facts
Yolanda D. visited her uncle, the appellant, at his Pennsylvania apartment six or seven times during the summer of 1991, staying overnight on three or four occasions. These visits occurred with her mother’s consent. The appellant characterized his relationship with Yolanda as “pretty close, you know, as family.” The appellant’s girlfriend corroborated the frequency of the visits. The petition alleged that the abuse occurred during these visits.
Procedural History
The Orange County DSS brought an Article 10 proceeding in Family Court. The Family Court found that the appellant sexually abused Yolanda and was a “person legally responsible” for her care. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s finding that the appellant was a proper respondent under Section 1012(a) of the Family Court Act. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellant met the statutory definition of a “person legally responsible” for Yolanda’s care during the summer of 1991, thus making him a proper respondent in the child protective proceeding.
Holding
Yes, because the appellant acted as the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial or household setting during the summer of 1991.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals interpreted Family Court Act § 1012(a) and (g), which define “respondent” and “person legally responsible.” The court rejected the appellant’s narrow interpretation, stating that the term “custodian” is not limited and that “other person responsible for the child’s care” should not be rendered superfluous by being interpreted identically to “custodian.” The court emphasized the legislative intent behind Article 10, which is to protect children from injury or mistreatment. The court stated, “The common thread running through the various categories of persons legally responsible for a child’s care is that these persons serve as the functional equivalent of parents.” The court clarified that while acting in loco parentis (intending to assume permanent responsibility) is distinct from acting as the functional equivalent of a parent (assuming temporary care), the latter still requires care analogous to parenting in a household or family setting. The court articulated factors to consider when determining if a person is the functional equivalent of a parent, including the frequency and nature of contact, the control exercised over the child’s environment, the duration of contact, and the relationship to the child’s parents. Here, the court found that the frequent visits to the appellant’s home, the overnight stays, and the mother’s consent, combined to show the appellant was regularly in the same household as Yolanda and regarded his relationship with her as familial. The court stated, “By permitting Yolanda to stay overnight in his home, appellant provided shelter, a traditional parental function, in an area geographically distant from the child’s own household.”